PKSOI Lessons Learned Report January 2019 | Page 7
3. Understand the local historical and sociopolitical context. This will help external actors
choose local partners for inclusion in various SSR activities. An in-depth knowledge of the
local context is crucial to being able to identify stakeholders, attitudes, connections, etc.
within the security sector and the affected communities.
4. Closely align SSR and DDR. Linking SSR and DDR items/issues/concerns from the
outset in program design will help to avoid duplication and ensure that activities reflect
common objectives.
5. Plan and carry out SSR and DDR processes according to well-documented guidelines –
which must be appropriately tailored to the given context. Avoid pressures to focus on only
the major tasks or to effect change as quickly as possible. Shortcuts – in vetting, training,
etc. – can undermine the security sector in the long run.
Sources:
1. Primary reference: “Security Sector Reconstruction in Post-Conflict: The Lessons
from Timor-Leste,” by Deniz Kocak, in “Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and
Transition,” National Defense University (NDU), 12 April 2016.
2. Other references:
“Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste: Missed Opportunities and Hard
Lessons in Empowering the Host-Nation,” by Nicholas J. Armstrong, Jacqueline
Chura-Beaver, and Isaac Kfir, PKSOI, April 2012
“Institutionalizing Community Policing in Timor-Leste: Exploring the Politics of
Police Reform,” by Nélson De Sousa C. Belo and Mark R. Koenig, The Asia
Foundation, December 2011
Dili, East Timor – 1 March 2000. The Portuguese contingent of
UNTAET sets out for a security patrol of the Becora district.
(Photo credit: UN / Eskinder Debebe)
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