PKSOI Lessons Learned Report January 2019 | Page 6

mentoring for new recruits was conducted over a mere 8-week timeframe; partnering with
Timorese ministries and officials was minimized (with various figures then obstructing the
process); and, UNMIT and its UNPOL component were not adequately resourced with
trainers/advisers possessing requisite professional expertise – nor were UN personnel
provided sufficient cultural knowledge. In all these shortcomings, UNMIT was repeating the
same mistakes made by UNTAET.
Timorese government officials, displeased with the lack of UN-ministerial partnering and the
net results of the international interventions (i.e., a disjointed security sector), eventually
took matters into their own hands. The opportunity for Timorese senior leaders to change
course and assert their autonomy in security matters arose in 2008. After assassination
attempts by rebels against the president and the prime minister in February, the Council of
Ministers declared a state of emergency and the formation of a “Joint F-FDTL and PNTL
Command.” This merger of the security organizations was not only a declaration of
Timorese sovereignty, but also a rejection of the externally imposed design/formation of
the security sector by international/UN missions and the repeated mistakes, namely:
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rushed actions to train-and-equip security personnel, rather than approaching
SSR and DDR interventions with a long-term commitment
neglect of the local sociopolitical and historical context (evidenced by partnering
with, and empowering, certain actors who had inflicted grave harm on large
segments of the population)
failure to have an integrated approach (i.e., external actors working hand-in-
hand with host nation ministries/officials) in planning, implementation, and
oversight of SSR and DDR
failure to “include” the voices of all former combatant groups/members –
including women
lack of due diligence in vetting recruits for the security forces
“….In the Timorese case, the recruitment of partisan former guerrilla fighters into the
newly founded Timorese military, as well as UNPOL’s unobservant recruitment of former
POLRI officers into the Timorese civilian police, laid the foundation of a politicized and
troubled Timorese security sector. … [and] in the rush to get military and policing boots
on the ground, opportunities to create a culture of public service, accountability to the law,
and professionalism may have been lost.” (Kocak, pp. 362 and 365)
Recommendations:
1. Utilize a holistic approach to SSR. SSR strategy should cover the entire security network
within the host nation – local security actors (military forces, national police, local police,
border security, etc.) and all relevant institutions (ministries of interior, defense, and finance;
national parliament; parliamentary committees that deal with security matters; etc.).
2. Incorporate measures aimed at preventing illicit practices throughout the security network.
Develop oversight mechanisms, objectives, and benchmarks for the purpose of eliminating
corruption, abuse of office, etc. which could otherwise adversely affect reform efforts.
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