Case Study # 0517-02 PKSOI TRENDS GLOBAL CASE STUDY SERIES
Russia ’ s position remained the opposite : that a political agreement on decentralization ( greater autonomy ) and special status for Donetsk and Luhansk , as well as amnesty for the separatists must be implemented “ in parallel ” with an agreement as quickly as possible on disengagement ( i . e ., ceasefire and withdrawal of forces ). However , Ukraine continued to demand a comprehensive ceasefire first , in accordance with the sequencing in the Minsk agreements . 54
In December 2016 , with strong support from Germany and France , the EU decided to extend its sanctions on Russia for another six months . 55
RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE THEORY
According to a February 2017 article in the “ Times of Israel ,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov articulated Russia ’ s main foreign policy objective as seeking “ an end to the Western-dominated world order .” This means stopping NATO and the EU ’ s encroachment into Russia ’ s historical sphere of influence or “ near abroad ,” and achieving regional hegemony . Part of Russia ’ s strategy is to fracture the European Union “ through influencing European elections in favor of pro-nationalistic candidates .” In its “ near abroad ” Russia ’ s strategy is to use a malleable definition of a victimized “ Russian Identity ” of ethnic Russians , Russian speakers , or simply Slavic peoples as being under constant political , cultural , or territorial attack from the West . 56
Two Russian military academics stated in the January 2017 monthly Russian journal “ Military Thought ” that , “[ S ] ince the end of the Cold War , the West ’ s struggle against our country has never stopped .... Therefore , Russia will remain the enemy of the West in the ongoing World War of this new type . The West will calm down only when our country and our people have been relegated to a state worthy of ridicule and contempt .” The authors argued that the traditional meaning of war still stands , as elucidated by Clausewitz in the 19th Century as “ an act of violence , using force upon the enemy to fulfill our will .” However , they also noted that in the 21st Century new forms of warfare have been added to the armed struggle , namely information warfare , sabotage operations “ on an enormous scale ,” and the West ’ s use of “ color revolutions ” in the former Soviet space , as well as in the Balkans and the Middle East . 57
According to the authors of a brief assessment of Russia ’ s warfare in Ukraine , Russia , possessing the capability and political will “ to escalate [ its ] hybrid warfare to the use of physical force to take what [ it ] want [ s ],” underwrites its military campaigning with a strategy of “ localized and temporal dominance ” that seeks to keep its neighbors destabilized and weak relative to itself and thus gain regional hegemony . Its means are covert action , cyber operations and information warfare , and the use of separatists in order to create zones of frozen conflict or “ strategic outposts ” from which to further manipulate its adversaries . When all these means , including the use of partisans , are not enough to achieve the objective at hand , then Russia commits conventional forces which try to melt into the countryside or back across the Russian border . 58 A version of this phenomenon has worked in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia , as well as in Ukraine .
A key aspect of Russia ’ s military involvement in Ukraine has been the lack of use of air power , while relying heavily on air defense systems to keep Ukrainian aircraft out of the battle . 59 The Russians ’ “ reconnaissance-strike model ” also relies heavily on drones , rocket and artillery fire , special reconnaissance , cyber capabilities , and geo-locating technologies that have delivered impressive tactical and operational results in Donbass . 60
As for humanitarian effects , Russia and the separatists have not been reluctant to inflict civilian casualties . Under continuous barrages of rocket and artillery fire throughout Donbass in what have in effect become “ siege operations ,” the political message has been that the government in Kyiv cannot protect civilians ; therefore the local population should support the separatists and side with Russia . This is limited warfare which does not seek to topple the existing regime , but to “ perpetually conduct operations aimed at weakening the adversary from the inside out ,” or , put another way ,