Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online
Strategic Considerations Relating to DDR
by Mr. Raymond Millen
At first blush, DDR—viz., Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration of former warring factions into society—is rather
straightforward, with degrees of success predicated on the
amount of resources and time dedicated to its fulfillment. As a
matter of practice, DDR often serves as the tactical component
of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which serves as the overarching framework, focusing on the political-security reform strategy for a designated nation-state. By military analogy, DDR is
the beachhead and SSR is the subsequent land campaign.
This subordinating relationship can potentially result in little
or no strategic analysis necessary to formulating a DDR strategy. Implementing a DDR program is so complex, laborious,
resource dependent, and time consuming, that it demands a
thorough understanding of the strategic implications. Realistically, if donor nations and organizations are truly interested in
assisting a post-war state, the effort requires a long-term DDR
commitment.
Generally, there are two instances in which DDR is appropriate: at the request of an existing government involved in an
extended insurgency; and in the aftermath of a conflict, resulting in regime change, wherein the new government seeks a fresh
start through DDR. In both cases, a peace agreement among
the former warring factions is an essential first step. The least
desirable course is to implement a partial or unilateral DDR if a
peace agreement is not implemented. Under these circumstances, peacekeeping or coalition troops would need to shoulder the
security burden until the host nation security forces are ready
to assume the burden. More problematic, the host nation is not
impelled to provide security for the populace, which is a core
function of the state, so legitimacy comes into question.
One should underscore that engaging in DDR activities signifies an intervention in a state’s internal affairs, which can
create foreign policy dilemmas for the intervening powers:
an entanglement in the domestic affairs of the host nation; a
commitment to the survival of the regime; and a cultivation of
host nation dependency on donor nations/organizations to the
point of inhibiting its evolution as a democracy.
Because of the aforementioned implications of DDR, intervention is a high policy decision, implying the national deliberative
body (i.e., the national security council or cabinet) should view
GHŌR, Afghanistan (May 28, 2012) – Former Taliban fighters line up to handover their Rifles to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during a reintegration ceremony
at the provincial governor’s compound. The re-integrees formally announced their agreement to join the Afghanistan Peace
and Reintegration Program during the ceremony. (Department
of Defense photograph by Lt. j. g. Joe Painter/RELEASED)
DDR through a strategic lens. First, it must determine that the
conditions are right for a DDR program to begin. Second, it
must take structural reform of the host nation political system
seriously rather than as a formality. Third, it must consider carefully the size, composition, and distribution of security forces
necessary for a democracy to prosper. These strategic considerations represent the golden triangle of DDR, and if they are
achieved, they will provide the host nation with a solid foundation for growth.
Determining the Prerequisites for Initiating DDR
As the national deliberative body considers the decision to
initiate a DDR program, it must not become hostage to events
or motivated by utopianism; instead discussion should focus on
the strategic effects it seeks to attain. As strategic theorist Colin
S. Gray instructs, strategy is the exercise of power in pursuit
of political goals, and its purpose is to change the behavior of
another political actor in ways the protect or promote national
interests. The sum total of activities that support a strategy
achieves a strategic effect, which is “the currency that produces
pksoi.army.mil
5