Thinking Strategically About Security Sector Reform
initially. SSR requires sufficient political will within the
affected nation. What constitutes sufficient will is open to
debate, but generally, the coalition of forces in the interaction between and among the population, the elites, and the
security actors within the state must be aligned in favor of
reform. An example of an alignment of forces would be
that the population supports the government, the political and economic elites recognize the need and value of
SSR for advancing the interests and legitimacy of the state,
government security providers have at least a temporary
advantage over the challengers to state security, and the
means—knowledge and resources—exist to reform. Local
ownership is pivotal to the equilibrium of sovereignty and
legitimacy in reforming states. External assistance can come
in many forms, but success requires that the reforming state
exert sovereignty in a “legitimate” manner. Therefore, rule
of law is inherent to successful enduring reform.
Security Sector Reform is context dependent. Culture
and economic, political, military, fiscal, physical and sociopsychological conditions define context and context matters. Reform occurs and progresses at different rates relative to the opportunities and obstacles presented by these
dimensions and the interactions among them. By understanding and incorporating context, assisting partners better
facilitate enduring reform and are less apt to do harm.
Security Sector Reform is integrative and interdependent in nature. Its outcomes—safety, security, and justice—are holistic constructs and greater than the sum of
their parts. These outcomes increasingly justify the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state, and the credibility of the
greater modern international order. Consequently, SSR
requires whole of government and comprehensive perspectives and efforts in order to achieve it, or to assist in its
achievement. Progress in any one aspect of SSR is invariably
dependent on relative progress in other dimensions of SSR
and national development. Ultimately, SSR is the fitting
together of multiple subsystems and systems to create a state
security structure that serves its population and engages
constructively in the international order.
Security Sector Reform’s foci must be sustainability,
capacity-building, and resilience. Emergency conditions
call for extraordinary solutions, but lasting Security Sector
Reform requires a more judicious approach by the reforming state and any who would assist it. Whatever solution
is sought, it must be sustainable over the long run. This
means it must be affordable and appropriate to the society
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served. Reform must lay the foundation for continued
improvement, not pursue an unachievable or unsustainable
standard. Capabilities need to be sufficient, but capacity
and resiliency must be the foci. First class technology and
world-class facilities do little to build capacity and create
resiliency if they cannot be repaired or staffed over the long
term.
SSR must be resourced relative to needs and progress,
not to artificial constructs or unfounded aspirations. Experience has shown that solutions that meet the local needs
and portend a better way forward may be more optimal
than implementing “better” outside solutions, even when
the latter are well financed. Funding that is not clearly addressing relevant needs and bridging to a perceived better
future promotes corruption and breeds disappointment as
the population suffers, or perceives their needs as ignored.
Transparency enhances the probability of proper reforms
and the value derived from any fiscal expenditures.
Understanding what Security Sector Reform is at the national
and local level, why it is so important to the international security community, and how we should think about it from a strategic perspective allows us to better pursue that myriad of ideas
and activities that constitute or contribute to effective reform.7
Bernard Brodie, World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949). 447.
2
Melanne A Civic and Michael Miklaucic, “The State and
the Use of Force: Monopoly and Legitimacy” in Monopoly
of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR, eds. Melanne A Civic
and Michael Miklaucic ( Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 2010), xvi-xviii.
3
Sovereign Challenge Conference “Regional Issues: Global
Implications,” March 2010, Notes of Harry R. Yarger, Seminar
participant observation to his colleagues.
4
U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department
of Defense, and, U.S. Department of State, Security Sector
Reform, 2008; available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/SSR_JS_
Mar2009.pdf; accessed February 13, 2012.
5
Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations
(Washington, D.C.: He adquarters, Department of the Army,
October 2008), Glossary 9, 6-3 through 6-4.
6
U.S. Agency for International Development.
7
See United States Institute of Peace and United States Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding
Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace,2009), 6-37 through 6-60
for a perspective of the range of Security Sector Reform and the
approaches and activities.
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