First, MINURSO’s withdraw could be taken by Morocco as the
UN agreeing with their claim to the territory. Morocco would
triumph by de facto, as Morocco already possesses over 85 per-
cent of Western Sahara. The UN withdraw would provide Mo-
rocco with apparent sovereignty over all of Western Sahara, and
afford free exploitation of its natural resources. 44 Additionally,
the Royal Moroccan Air Force, which to this point is restricted
by MINURSO oversight, would now be free to leverage its air
superiority in Western Sahara. 45 This would permit Morocco
to conduct an air-centric counterinsurgency campaign against
the Polisario military, a tactic that has proven successful in both
the Middle East and South Africa over the last fifty years. 46
Morocco could undertake punitive action against Polisario
military encroachments with impunity, absent any observation
by international organizations, giving them uncontested access
to Western Sahara. Despite MINURSO’s presence, Morocco
intermittently threatens military action against Polisario forces
anytime Morocco believes the Polisario violated the ceasefire. 47
Currently, western benefactors and the risk of international
commendation may be the only thing preventing Morocco from
taking these actions.
Absent MINURSO, Morocco could start exploiting natural
resources from Western Sahara without the current legal objec-
tions. 48 However, in doing so, Morocco may squander its peace
dividend, as VEOs would be emboldened to attack Morocco’s
phosphate facilities and 500-mile long conveyor belts transport-
ing extracted minerals from the desert to the coast. To protect
these assets, Morocco military forces would likely cease moni-
toring regions beyond the berm, allowing these areas to evolve
into ungoverned spaces, thus offering inroads for VEOs. 49
Impacts to the United States
There appears to be little political advantage if the US were
to withdraw political or fiscal support to MINURSO, 50 even
though the US is frustrated with MINURSO’s lack of prog-
ress. 51 If Morocco were to initiate military action against the
Polisario as a result of MINURSO’s withdraw, the US, as well
as a majority of the other UN members, may be compelled to
openly condemn Morocco’s actions. This action may seriously
jeopardize the US's longstanding bilateral relationship that it
currently enjoys with Morocco, losing a valuable ally in the fight
against terrorism in Northern Africa. 52 Also, if the US were to
reduce its support to Morocco, it may bring into question US
support to other Arab nations, especially those that have not
been US allies as long as Morocco. Such a perception could
conceivably cause setbacks to recent US policy advances in the
greater Middle East. Overall US foreign policy would not fare
well if this perception were to exist and would be a boon to any
near-peer competitors vying for regional power in Northwest-
ern Africa.
Conclusion
Western Sahara, Morocco, and northwest Africa have experi-
enced amazing advancements in the development of civilization
on this fault line, but for every step forward, the region has suf-
fered through just as many steps backward. There may be plenty
of scenarios that could come from the Western Sahara conflict,
but for a positive, win-win scenario to occur, it will “only work
when both sides sincerely seek a settlement.” 53 Both Moroc-
co and the Polisario have the ability to avoid prolonging this
stalemate. Shifting regional partnerships, evolving international
events, and developing aspects of the 21st-century social envi-
ronment may someday result in the UN ending MINURSO’s
mandate, limiting future choices between the two belligerents.
Instead of controlling the outcomes of their situations, Morocco
and the Polisario may find that it is too late to positively affect
the outcome of their respective environments and socio-eco-
nomic circumstances. The US is also poised with an opportu-
nity to wield its vast wealth of national power to nudge these
two sides toward a positive outcome. However, if the conflict is
not positively resolved, the US may find itself playing catch-up
in maintaining any security or economic prosperity or fulfilling
US regional strategic goals in northwestern Africa and Western
Sahara.
About the Author: Mr. Klemens ‘Van’ Schmidt is a recent
graduate of the US Army War College (AWC) (AY 2018) as an
interagency partner from the US Department of State, where he
is a Program Analyst. Prior to that, he was a Strategist (FA59)
as a US Army Officer. Mr. Schmidt also holds a Master from the
School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (SCAR), George
Mason University, Virginia. This article is an abbreviated
version of his AWC thesis and can be found in its entirety at Re-
search Gate as “The Western Sahara Conflict, Lose-Lose Scenar-
ios, and Impacts to United States Regional Strategic Objectives”
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326882349_The_
Western_Sahara_Conflict_Lose-Lose_Scenarios_and_Im-
pacts_to_United_States_Regional_Strategic_Objectives)
Notes:
“Non-Self-Governing Territories,” linked from The United
Nations and Decolonization Home Page at “Committee of 24”;
United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/95, Question
of Western Sahara, A/72/456, December 7, 2017.
2
United Nations Peacekeeping, “MINURSO Fact Sheet, Unit-
ed Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,”
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minurso.
1
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