US Position on the Western Sahara Conflict
Since Morocco is in possession of approximately 85 percent of
Western Sahara, it would be advantageous to the US if Mo-
rocco’s national interests were to remain generally aligned with
the United State’s regional strategy. For more than two decades
the US has “stayed on the fence” regarding the Western Sahara,
while continuing to publicly support the UN’s position that the
status of Western Sahara should be determined by referendum. 21
Though the US also has a well-established and often-repeated
position on the Western Sahara in that Morocco’s autonomy
proposal is “serious, realistic, and credible,” 22 it has taken some
conflicting actions that clashed with Morocco’s position. If
these US-Morocco points of divergence over the Western Saha-
ra were allowed to grow, the conflict could become a significant
obstacle in promoting US interests in the region. 23
The US position at the UN is to urge Morocco and the Polis-
ario to work toward a peaceful resolution. 24 The US has en-
dorsed the Madrid Accords of 1975, recognizing Moroccan
administrative authority over Western Sahara, but without sov-
ereignty. 25 The US was a primary force behind the drafting and
adoption of UNSCR 690, 26 though the US does not recognize
SADR and has no publicized interaction with the Polisario. 27
The US supports UN mediation efforts, urging the two sides to
reach a mutually acceptable solution, 28 though one that would
not destabilize Morocco. 29 Likewise, the US contributes funds,
though no personnel, to MINURSO. 30
Loss of the United Nation Mandate
The non-renewal of MINURSO’s mandate, resulting in UN
peacekeepers withdrawing from Western Sahara, would leave
the two sides to resolve their differences without UN assis-
tance. MINURSO’s success has been restricted to stopping
violence between belligerents, but MINURSO is also seen by
some as failing to carry out the intent of the referendum. 31 It
has been quipped that MINURSO has managed to keep peace
in Western Sahara “more from improvisation and luck than by
planning.” 32 Even if this were the case, MINURSO still does
provide a passive political and military approach that allows
Morocco and the Polisario to avoid fabricating a solution that
neither side wants, can sell to their respective populations, nor
has the political power to see through to completion. With
MINURSO maintaining a status quo, neither Morocco’s, nor
the Polisario’s leadership have to produce anything, therefore
avoiding being seen as failing.
However, there is cynicism and skepticism about MINURSO
from several directions. 33 There is a widespread belief that
MINURSO has overstayed its purpose, and there is no reason
to continue paying to monitor the stalemate, approximately
$1.3 billion since 1991, with little positive results. 34 MIN-
URSO is criticized for taking a “western approach to dispute
settlement,” 35 intent on confining violence, rather than address-
ing the causes of the argument. 36 Despite the criticism, in 2016,
then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, while recommend-
ing renewal of the mandate, stated “the risk of a rupture of the
ceasefire and a resumption of hostilities…will grow significantly
in the event MINURSO departs or finds itself unable to exe-
cute the mandate.” 37
Impacts to the Polisario
Generations of Sahrawi have only known life in refugee camps
or under occupation by Spain or Morocco. MINURSO’s depar-
ture may be seen as a step further away from the Polisario’s goal
of monitored and peaceful self-determination, which instead
may only be resolved through violence. 38 In 2014, then SADR
President Mohamed Abdelaziz stated, “SADR forces will have
little choice but to either take up arms against Morocco or radi-
calize to reach their goals if the UN fails to settle the conflict.” 39
Even with MINURSO’s presence, the Polisario is finding it
increasingly difficult to keep its citizens, especially its youth,
from taking it upon themselves to resolve the deadlock, likely
through violence. Additionally, without some manner of UN
acknowledgment of the Sahrawi cause, Algeria would be hard
pressed from an international viewpoint to continue supporting
the Polisario cause. If the UN were to cease funding the peace-
keeping mission, aid for the refugee camps would prove difficult
at current levels. 40 This would offer even more reason for the
Sahrawi to take some manner of violent action to reclaim part
of Western Sahara, as the alternative is long-term survival in
refugee camps.
Conversely, without the presence of MINURSO and UN
oversight, the Polisario may find it easier in allying with violent
extremist organizations (VEOs), 41 or instigating an insurgency.
The Polisario has an advantage of operating in the desert sans a
reliance on technology, while also benefiting from a sanctuary
in Algeria, all the while retaining the perception of an under-
dog. Whereas the UN resolution discourages the international
community from providing military or political support to the
Polisario, a UN withdraw might encourage numerous regional
or international actors to support the Polisario with the intent
of upsetting Morocco’s control of Western Sahara. 42
Impacts to Morocco
At first glance, it appears that Morocco would have little to lose
and much to gain if MINURSO pulled out of Western Saha-
ra. 43
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