erations on governance and national direction taking place inside and outside the capitol . 81
This problem can be mitigated first and foremost by acting based on a sound strategy with a clear objective in mind , 82 and keeping the final objective in mind when designing tactical steps . Clausewitz phrased this , in “ On War ”, as “ tactics is the art of using troops in battle ; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war .” 83 In challenges of R & S , winning the war is not limited to the destruction of an enemy ’ s ability to wage war , but to the achievement of a better peace , 84 which requires the work and expertise of a far greater array of governmental and non-governmental organizations , strategists and operators than is contained within any military . Planners and operators alike must keep in mind that intervention is no longer a matter of military involvement alone , and thus lacks a single unified chain of command and communication .
Rather , conditions involve military , governmental , non-governmental , local , international and regional actors within the same space — what are now called complex operations . Each of the actors involved may be pursuing a different strategy , and based on a different set of principles and capabilities . While there are some who argue for unity of effort involving nongovernmental as well as military and civilian governmental entities , 85 86 this tends to be resisted heavily , and for reasons which must be acknowledged and respected . 87 NGOs working within local populations and with local staff members , for example , depend on a perception of neutrality and distance from national agendas and military forces for their safety and for their ability to interact within marginalized popula-
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