All these paradigms have limitations , the main one being that they explain what happens within the national framework , or bilaterally when it is a question of recalling an inter-state conflict , whereas memory games are becoming globalised and are becoming narrative supports of the new geopolitics . The logic of bilateral games of appeasement characteristic of the immediate post-Cold War period is being replaced by belligerent tendencies which , by means of the revival of contentious pasts , seek international competition , the stigmatisation of the adversary , the exclusion of political enemies and , for Russia , constitute the prelude to territorial conquest .
The revival of points of contention involving painful pasts are on the rise , as between China and Japan , Japan and Korea , Italy and Slovenia . Greece has made claims for war reparations from Germany , as has the Polish government . Spain faces reparations claims from certain Central American countries .
The avatars of colonialism are reflected in former colonies ’ claims for the restitution of cultural goods and material reparations . Since 2019 , the resolution of the European Parliament obliges member states to take specific measures such as restituting looted goods or allowing free access to the archives of colonialism . The geopolitical memorial fault lines are being renewed , especially between African and Asian countries and former colonising states such as France , Great Britain , Italy , Belgium , the Netherlands , etc . These discussions are the direct consequence of the proliferation of memorial laws that seem to impose censorship on historians ’ work . The burgeoning of historical memory policies launched by certain politicians on all sides irritates historians . Even more so when social activists , journalists , police officers , judges , diplomats or members of parliament interfere in the disciplinary field and when social media are inflamed .
It was in this period at the turn of two centuries , the 20 th and the 21 st , that we felt the need to reflect on concepts intrinsic to political sociology , including both the tactics of memorial actors and their actions in the internationalisation of memorial strategies .
The change of scale in the first decade of the new millennium
But first , to better define the concepts we need , let ’ s return to Putin ’ s historicisation strategy .
Today , Putin appears to be an epigone and continuator of the visions of Ratzel or Haushofer , but especially of Stalin . In reality , Putin basically thinks the same thing but needs an additional justification . And this is where a memorial masquerade comes in : Nazism , racism , anti-Semitism and the reminder of the origins of Russia ’ s greatness .
The portfolio of historical and memorial references does not stop for Russia at European history . Since Putin ’ s speech to the audience of sad and empty-looking regime beneficiaries , except for the infantile excitement of Kadyrov , on 30 September 2022 , after the counting of the so-called democratic referenda , to announce the annexation of the four oblasts of Ukraine , the Russian President has been emphasising the clash of civilisations in a Huntingtonian manner . He reminds the Russian generation that lived under Soviet rule of the prevailing ideology : the accusation of the colonialist West with the American devil and his axiological degeneracies as a main topic .
However , the core of the revisionist mobilising discourse is not Russia ’ s thousand-year-old history , such as that recounted by Putin at the beginning of the invasion in February 2022 , which I outlined in the introduction , nor that of the clash of civilisations . At the centre of the memorial device is the “ Great Patriotic War ”. Why is this so ?
In the early 2000s , and even more so since the annexation of Crimea , a “ memory offensive ” has taken place around the “ Great Patriotic War ”, against the Nazism of 1941-1945 , to the point that it is now “ a kind of mystical cult ”.
In fact , in order to justify the reconstitution of the empire , necessarily by military means , Putin must not only have his army and generals behind him but also the population . It is a question of building legitimacy by resorting to a historical
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Observing Memories Issue 6