Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 55

THE APOLITICAL MYTH

Despite being the most senior strategic commander of all alliance and coalition forces in the field, McKiernan continued to operate under the false premise that domestic politics in the capitals of the troop contributing nations might somehow not intrude into his headquarters. Moreover, he was willing to publicly doubt German tactical limitations “as a soldier,” to a German publication, no less, failing to recognize the constitutional limitations on the Bundeswehr’s ability to deploy to “wars,” owing to the country’s complicated relationship with the legacy of Nazi aggression and the institutional checks the United States helped install during post-World War II occupation.27 While the potential impact is generally less at the lower ranks, Krulak’s “strategic corporal” waits in the wings. Better that the corporal is cognizant of the potential strategic—or, as this essay would argue, political—impact of his or her actions and interactions with multinational partners. In the author’s experience serving alongside coalition partners in Multi-National Force-Iraq, it was vital that even company grade officers and soldiers understand the domestic political constraints of other troop contributing nations. The ability of particular contingents to travel outside the wire might be more limited in the run-up to an election in the contingent’s home capital, for instance. If American service members were unaware of the context of such limitations, it could lead to friction when one coalition partner had unrealistic expectations of what another contingent could offer tactically at a particular point in time. If the “apolitical” service members of each state are ignorant of the political context in their own capitals, what is the likelihood they will understand the political context in the capitals of their alliance or coalition partners? This is not to suggest that service members should take a normative position about domestic politics, whether in their own capital or those of a coalition partner. This is long-standing advice, as even the Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain cautioned in 1942 against criticizing the English King.28 In a modern context that is the partisanship to be avoided in the interest of good order and discipline. Instead, what is required is political awareness and understanding.
MILITARY REVIEW ? September-October 2013

The Host-Nation Context

Operationally, contemporary conflicts in which America has been engaged in the post-Cold War era have frequently been with the government of the state in which they are operating as an ally rather than enemy, most obviously MNF-I in Iraq and NATO ISAF in Afghanistan with the Maliki and Karzai governments, respectively. As the British chief of the General Staff, Gen. Sir David Richards, emphasized when he was the commander, ISAF— The close Political/Military interaction with the Government of Afghanistan [GOA] . . . [is a] defining factor of NATO’s operations in Afghanistan . . . the multinational force in Afghanistan has to listen to civil partners, both from the international community and, more importantly, the Afghan Government and people themselves, for without their buy-in we will never have a lasting solution.29 Richards went on to assert, “this is where NATO will, in the final analysis be judged . . . Did we work tirelessly, in partnership with the GOA and Afghan people, for culturally acceptable solutions to Afghan problems?”30 The implication of Richards’ observations is that political ignorance within the ranks may be a serious complicating factor in the accomplishment of the alliance’s mission on the battlefield. Just as service members at all levels need to understand the political context of their own country and of their multinational military partners, understanding is required of the political context of the host government on whose behalf those in uniform are fighting, bleeding, and dying. Soldiers advising in the establishment of ministerial-level security forces who are politically ignorant are likely in danger of replicating the creation of “professional” but politically involved armed forces, such as those of A????????????????????????????A?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????%???????????Q??????????????????????5?????????????q???????????t???????????????????????M????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????U8???????????????????????(??((0