Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 54
popular support in a war of survival. This is the second domestic component of political understanding required of those in uniform. Service men and women at all levels must understand that anything they do or fail to do during operations in the field or in garrison could in some way affect this delicate balance. At the end of the 20th century, the commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Gen. Charles C. Krulak, coined the term “strategic corporal” to capture the idea that those in the lowest tacticallevel unit had the potential to affect outcomes at the highest strategic level, disproportionate to the rank on their sleeve.21 While the term would be anathema to the U.S. military, perhaps more accurate than “strategic corporal” might be “political corporal,” because the ultimate level—and ultimate commander—is not strategic, but political. Military hierarchies incorporate the need to understand “commander’s intent” down to the lowest levels, yet fail to recognize that the ultimate commander—the president of the United States—likewise has his or her own political “commander’s intent” that must be understood in order to ensure success of a military mission. Political ignorance may result in tactical success yet strategic failure—winning battles, but losing the war. A service member unaware of the political context in which he or she operates is in danger of inadvertently damaging the domestic political consensus upon which a mission is based, just as subordinates might undermine a “purely military” objective if they fail to understand the higher commander’s intent. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, casualties per se are not what undermine domestic political support for operations. Rather, it is the American public’s assessment of the likelihood of success.22
of MNF-I, Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, notes, “in a coalition the commander, particularly the force commander, has a job that is significantly more complex, arguably more demanding, certainly more political, requires the commander to exercise command in a very different way, and places considerable additional demands on his time.”25
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