Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 28

to any war, but is critically important to combating a dynamic and evolving hybrid threat. A deep understanding, bordering on empathy, of a hybrid threat will help to develop an effective strategy to combat it. This understanding must include the threat’s powers of resistance, ideology, resolve, history, and culture.38 A thorough understanding of the enemy will lead to a clear strategy with significant chances for success. Attempts to gain intelligence superiority over a hybrid threat will also strain the military expertise of the Army Profession. The U.S. Army currently possesses a significant array of Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) systems.39 Properly employed RISTA systems can provide Army forces with real time operational data, time sensitive targeting, and a detailed representation of the threat and operational environment. However, this system is based on layers of sensors to gather information. By overwhelming and saturating RISTA system sensors with false information, a hybrid threat can negate

a U.S. Army technological advantage.40 From a strategic perspective, this condition represents an A-type military deception where a hybrid threat increases ambiguity surrounding its operations by saturating U.S. RISTA sensors with false and irrelevant information.41 Intelligence analysts could draw false conclusions from conflicting data and pass incorrect information to Army leaders. Decisions would then be made based on false information and intelligence. Knowledge and training inculcates Army leaders with military expertise to exercise mission command and required discretionary judgments without close supervision.42 An incomplete understanding of a hybrid threat and an operational environment will complicate an Army leader’s decision-making cycle. Clausewitz described a state of psychological fog (unpredictability and uncertainty) that clouded the judgment of the military commander.43 RISTA saturation by a hybrid threat aligns with Clausewitz’s theory and will create a psychological fog in Army leaders that obstructs military expertise. In

(U.S. Army, D. Myles Cullen)

U.S. Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., Army chief of staff, participates in an after-action briefing following a full-spectrum operation exercise at Fort Polk, La., 23 October 2010.

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September-October 2013 ? MILITARY REVIEW