Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 27

H YB R I D T H R E AT

the IDF.31 Although knowledge of conventional warfighting still existed in the IDF, the lack of training in that area created a shortage of military expertise in conventional operations. Israeli ground forces found themselves at a tactical disadvantage when fighting Hezbollah in a hybrid war. Swinging the U.S. Army training pendulum too far to the right (the conventional paradigm) or too far to the left (the irregular paradigm) has the potential to create similar issues for future U.S. Army forces engaging in hybrid warfare. Composite risk management will be critical to identify acceptable risks and well-developed controls to help maintain a high level of military expertise across the range of military operations in the future.

the achievement of objectives bogs down. The lack of quick and tangible results in a hybrid war raises questions of confidence in the military strategy to the conflict. Measures of effectiveness and timelines for termination of the conflict can be hard to gauge and then explain to the public. Waning popular support for the war inevitably follows. Skepticism and doubts have the potential to erode the bonds of trust critical for the Army Profession to fully function. In the 2006 Second Lebanon War,

Extended Nature of Conflict

Another challenge to winning a hybrid war is the extended nature of the conflict. Hybrid warfare is inherently protracted. No quick solutions exist in these wars. In most cases, the U.S. Army will possess technological, organizational, and professional military advantages in relation to its adversaries. In order to overcome the U.S. Army’s technological advantages, potential adversaries will wage hybrid warfare to extend conflicts in time and space. Also, adversaries will expand wars to include indigenous populations. A hybrid war eventually devolves into a protracted battle of wills to control a population and test the strategic patience of a hybrid threat’s opponents.32 Throughout history, numerous technologically superior nations failed to achieve lasting, decisive victory due to the protracted nature of hybrid war. Temporal and spatial protraction of hybrid conflicts will strain the public’s trust in the Army Profession. As regards the importance of trust in the Army Profession, Gen. Robert Cone stated that, “trust can be considered the life blood of our profession.”33 Trust permeates throughout the whole organization and enables the Army to successfully employ Landpower across the globe in response to current and future contingency operations. Trust from soldier to soldier, soldier to officer, civilian leaders to Army leaders, and between citizens and the Army creates mutual bonds of confidence in the actions of the other. As a hybrid conflict protracts, civilians, political leaders, and military personnel in combat begin to question the approach to war as
MILITARY REVIEW ? September-October 2013

A hybrid war eventually devolves into a protracted battle of wills to control a population …
broken trust between the IDF and the Israeli people were voiced in the media. Television newscasts “denounced the IDF and what it called idiotic maneuvers.”34 Front page stories in newspapers questioned the IDF decision-making process, failing goals in the war, and army performance.35 By the end of the conflict, historical consensus among experts maintains that the Israeli public was demoralized and frustrated. They felt betrayed by pre-war IDF predictions of a quick, decisive victory and the actual outcomes of the conflict.36 Widespread Israeli discontent after the 2006 Second Lebanon War provides a contemporary example of popular unrest similar to Americans in the 1970s after the Vietnam Conflict. This portion of U.S. Army history has become a repressed and overlooked memory tucked away in literature and post-war studies. However, if it has happened before, it can happen again.

Strategic Objectives

In addition to protraction, hybrid warfare requires a detailed understanding of the strategic objectives of the enemy. Sun Tzu proposed the timeless theory, “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”37 In Sun Tzu’s view, it was critical to understand the enemy (their strengths, weaknesses, and motivations) as well as yourself to ensure victory. This theory is applicable
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