Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 86

operations that will directly affect homeland
defense. Fourth, offensive cyberspace, offensive
counternetworks, and offensive counterspace have
the potential to make any regional A2/AD fight
global in nanoseconds. Importantly, warfare in
those domains blurs distinctions of operational and
strategic depth; they fuse to form a global battle
space. Fifth, cyberspace and space warfare can
easily disrupt America’s ability to mount credible
defenses and synchronized offenses. Anti-access/
area denial adversaries do not need armed forces
that mirror image America’s force-on-force military; in contrast, asymmetric warfighting allows
A2/AD adversaries to do without an intercontinental bomber force or massive blue water navy.
All of these considerations point to the underlying
changes in the characteristics of war in this era.
Understanding these changes that act as a theoretical and strategic lasso around a group of diverse
A2/AD adversaries improves American deterrence
and its ability to win wars.

Challenge—Getting to the Fight

Lack of anticipation and respect for A2/AD could
leave American combat power depleted, public
support eroded, and ally confidence undermined
well before traditional phase II (seize the initiative) operations. Anti-access/area denial adversary
campaign actions may be serial, episodic, or simultaneous. The key point is that if an adversary can
impede U.S. force flows and projection timelines,
it has established control outside of the kinetic
engagement ranges of all but a few of our nation’s
long-range weapons systems. Anti-access/area
denial allows adversaries, to one degree or another,
to shift confrontation to ever-farther distances from
their sovereign territory. As a way of war, A2/AD
means that the joint expeditionary force will be in
contact with adversary effects at times and locations
that do not fit with general joint force warfare experience and understanding. It is highly unlikely U.S.
forces would survive the transit to local bases and
ports unaffected and unscathed. Similarly, under
these conditions, a disorganized and disrupted host
nation may not be able to deliver vital initial support. In particular, as logistical workarounds may
have to be utilized, unprepared joint force units
may not receive timely support because “best fit”
ports of debarkation are the most likely targets of
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adversary A2/AD systems.6 Clearly, operating in
A2/AD engagement envelopes will force leaders
and policy makers to reconsider how U.S. forces
are redeveloped and postured.
Interestingly, strategic leaps of U.S. land warfare
forces, a recent stimulating idea, may yield untenable projection options because of the havoc caused
by disrupted, jumbled force flows and absence
of logistics sanctuaries close to the primary fight
arena(s). Given global distances, especially across
the Pacific, if land warfare forces move in the early
hours and days of a U.S. campaign, they cannot
leave their equipment behind on America’s shores
with the assumption it will get to the fight in time
for those forces to accomplish their counter-A2/
AD missions. At least part of the solution for land
warfare forces is to move with their lighter equipment and to enhance their agility, but that means
their support must be proactively and responsibly
executed in new ways by the joint force team. To
ensure such support, air and naval forces must
employ their respective counter-A2/AD TTPs
(Air-Sea Battle) in concert with land warfare forces
TTPs—all within over-arching joint force concept
of operations where each service plays defined
roles. Some commentators may claim these ideas
have been tried before or that we already do them,
but while A2/AD may have a historically familiar
ring, it would render strategic reasoning tone deaf
to not recognize that A2/AD can now be effectively
utilized by a range of regimes to do far more than
mitigate our stealth aircraft. One new development
is that A2/AD opposes the projection that gets the
joint force within fighting distance.
The vision of land warfare forces countering
A2/AD neither challenge the laws of physics nor
requires exquisite capabilities manufactured from
unobtanium. However, getting land warfare forces
into a counter-A2/AD fight begins today with an
emphasis on better future TTPs and associated concept of operations to maximize U.S. technologies in
innovative combinations that gain and maintain the
upper hand. Additionally, planners must assume that
the U.S. logistics enterprise will remain constrained
in its ability to provide full capability and capacity
in an A2/AD environment. Reliable and timely joint
force movement and resupply will be crucial efforts
that likely will be U.S. operations centers of gravity.7 Additionally, A2/AD’s diplomatic, economic,
November-December 2013

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