Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 85

O V E R CO M I N G A 2/ A D
As an illustration of the differences in a counterA2/AD campaign, in an attempt to circumvent one
of the goals in figure 4, U.S. leaders may attempt to
sidestep strategic preclusion and operational exclusion by hurriedly boosting forward military presence during a prewar crisis. Yet, such action could
cause unforeseen consequences. In the case of an
incomplete or inaccurate understanding of an A2/
AD adversary’s escalation calculus, rapid regional
buildups of U.S. forces could jeopardize regional
balance America is attempting to stabilize. Large
U.S. force movements intended to reassure allies
could instead provoke uncontrollable escalation
that make massed U.S. forward
forces irresistible targets for an
adversary’s preemptive strikes.
The existence of A2/AD is not
Strategic Preclusion
oriented on a single actor, like
China or Iran. As described in
• Adversary A2/AD ways and means may compel U.S.
figure 4, the goals of A2/AD are
leaders to conclude adversary cannot be overcome
common to denial capabilities
• Fractured U.S. alliances; alliances may become weakemployed by potential adversarened
ies and competitors.
• May compel the U.S. in key domain(s) with demonstraTo summarize the description
tions and/or use of force
of the current A2/AD environment, here are 25,000-foot level
Operational Exclusion
takeaways so far: first, to hamper
• May block joint force points of entry
a
more powerful nation’s air and
• May compel high-risk concentration of U.S. forces
naval forces are at the heart of
• Seeks to operate throughout U.S. strategic and operaany nation’s denial strategy. In
tional depths to blunt joint force deployment, transit
certain scenarios, a well-orchesforward
trated A2/AD portfolio can hold
stronger nations at bay long
Operational Degradation
enough to increase the political
and economic costs of conflict
• Seeks to induce chronic friction in joint force operations
significantly. Second, A2/AD
through multiple lines of effort
technologies will certainly con• Seeks to degrade and where appropriate, destroy U.S.
tinue to metastasize because
bases, facilities to affect joint force mission generation
they have an appealing military
• Seeks to sever joint force C4/ISR connectivity
and economic effectiveness.
Strategic Exhaustion
Technology proliferation will
allow A2/AD actors to deploy
• Seeks to neutralize forward forces; interdict joint force
more disruptive technologies
forward deployment
than ever before. Third, A2/AD
• May force logistical over-extension
strategy will gradually appear in
• May compel U.S. and Allies to accept a disadvantaged
more places throughout the
settlement
range of military operations than
just high-intensity warfare, to
include space and cyberspace
Figure 4: A2/AD Goals

conflate these “goals” with ends. Rather, these goals
are considered a framework to explain the strategic
and operational so what of A2/AD. From figure 4, it
is easy to connect the dots between A2/AD effects
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