Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 83

O V E R CO M I N G A 2/ A D
force capabilities that are powerful, effective, and
unique. The following are key areas that should
frame land warfare TTPs to concept of operations
development for employment against the kinds of
targets depicted in figure 3.
First, America’s land warfare forces contribute
vital air/missile defense capacity, offensive/defensive cyberspace capabilities, and space operations
competencies. In crucial ways, those land force
capabilities are game-changers and necessary to
joint mission accomplishment.
Second, in integrated cross-domain operations—
an idea introduced in the Joint Operational Access
Concept—land warfare forces will be America’s
best means to perform reconnaissance, raids, and
seizures, as well as mitigate key adversary systems

Countering A2/AD: Potential
Land Warfare Missions
RECONNAISANCE
• Identify A2/AD systems, platforms, capabilities
• First effort in establishing routes, corridors &
zones for joint force follow-on operations
• Establish persistent presence
RAIDS
• Render key A2/AD targets operationally ineffective
• Surprise entry, swift execution, rapid exit that
utilizes existing, honed joint force TTPs
• Requires well-equipped cross domain units
utilizing mission command, distributed land
warfare TTPs

SEIZURES
• Wrest key terrain from adversary
• Enable follow-on joint force counter A2/AD to
disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, and if necessary,
destroy
• Allows land warfare forces to influence indigenous personnel

Figure 2: Land Forces Utilization
MILITARY REVIEW

• November-December 2013

and create additional options in all five domains for
the joint force commander. As expected, such land
warfare force efforts will in turn set the conditions
for follow-on operations.3
Third, incorporating land warfare forces into
an overall redeveloped joint force with optimized
counter-A2/AD TTPs and concept of operations—
the capability hardware plus the better warfighting
idea software—ensures commanders have the most
diverse set of military tools to address a range of
A2/AD situations and actors.
To ensure unity of effort, vision, and purpose,
fielding a highly capable counter-A2/AD land warfare force requires planning that is informed by the
counter-A2/AD forces redevelopment efforts across
the Armed Services. America’s leaders are asking
what the Army’s future force should look like; this
article steps into that future force design discussion
with a vision of restructured land warfare forces
to help overcome a major challenge of the 21st
century: A2/AD. To develop counter-A2/AD competencies does not mean the Army must abandon
its counterinsurgency capabilities, experiences, and
competencies; this is a false choice. But in asking
what the future force must look like, A2/AD must
inform discussions on the kind of Army needed to
satisfy projected future requirements—the discussion that should serve to frame the scope of full
spectrum warfare.

The Problem—What is A2/AD?

Anti-Access/Area Denial’s complexities and
capabilities can approach classic definitions of total
war in that A2/AD cyberspace, space, and longrange missile attacks can bring war’s effects into
America’s homeland. At the policy level, an A2/
AD adversary will utilize its own diplomatic-information-military-economic-finance-intelligencelaw enforcement campaign to attain its national
objectives. In this way A2/AD is the adversary’s
countershaping corollary to America’s diplomacy
and security cooperation. Practically speaking, in
steady state, A2/AD is a style of aggressive peace
and an aggressive style of war—both will mean the
effects of instability and war is not likely confined
to a distant locality or region. In simplest terms,
A2/AD is a portfolio of ways and means developed
to thwart joint force access, reduce freedom of
action, and curtail operational latitude.4 As a way
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