Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 76
While commanders are responsible for creating
a command climate that exudes professionalism
and encourages respect, the lower echelons of
leadership will win the war at the platoon, squad,
and individual levels. SHARP Stand-Down Days
are important to educate and initiate discussion on
the topic, but they alone are not enough. Leaders
must rigorously enforce the principles of SHARP
at every formation, function, office, motor pool,
and flight line on a daily basis. Commanders must
provide a safe environment for their subordinates. In no way should this be confused with an
environment that lacks discipline or encourages
laziness. This is about the commander addressing
misconduct within the formation. Strong senior
leaders must empower strong subordinate leaders
to ensure they are setting the proper example and
creating an atmosphere conducive to trust and
open communication without fear of intimidation
or repercussion for doing what is right.
Creating a Culture of Respect
The U.S. Armed Forces is the most adaptable,
successful, and morally anchored force in the
world. It is national news when senior military
leaders fail to uphold certain core values and
principles in their daily lives. I am proud to be
part of an organization that demands the highest level of moral fortitude from leaders at every
level. Frankly, if a leader cannot uphold the high
ethical standards expected of officers and senior
noncommissioned officers, then they have no
place in this organization. How can one be trusted
to instill order, discipline, respect, and resilience
into their subordinates when they fail to display
those qualities in their own lives? We have seen
a recent strategic surge to end a problem that is
poisoning our formations, but ultimately, the success of this strategy is dependent on the quality of
the implementation at the lowest levels. Because
of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the agile
and adaptive leaders throughout our Armed Forces
maintain a certain skill set that can apply at the
lowest levels. Commanders must ensure a fair,
deliberate process to determine the guilt or innocence of any individual accused of an offense.
The atmosphere within our units must change—
complacency must end. Leaders at every level have
a professional and moral obligation to become more
involved in the lives of their subordinates. This
begins by strictly enforcing a professional work
environment, but also extends to social situations.
We are professionals 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year, and must conduct ourselves accordingly. By applying these fundamental principles, we
can reshape our approach to SHARP as we continue
to promote dignity, respect, and integrity in the fight
to end sexual assault in the Armed Forces. MR
NOTES
1. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1.
2. Ibid., chap. 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities.”
3. Ibid., 1-11.
4. FM 3-24, 1-5.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 1-21.
8. Ibid., E-2.
9. Ibid., 1-26, 5-13.
10. Ibid., 1-15.
11. John Nagl, debate on Counterinsurgency and the Future of Afghanistan,
22 April 2013, at Grinnell College, between Col. Gian Gentile and Dr. John Nagl.
Video from: .
12. FM 3-24, 1-9.
13. Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The
Philippines, 1899-1902,” Parameters, XXXV (Spring 2005): 58.
14. Seth G Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2008), 8.
15. Ibid., 1-26.
16. Ibid., 1-2.
74
17. Ibid., E-3.
18. Jones, 9.
19. Ibid., 10.
20. Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2013), vol. I, 1, available at .
21. Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2013), Volume II, 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, 3, available at .
22. Ibid., 2.
23. Ibid., 1.
24. Ibid., 3.
25. Ibid., 4.
26. Ibid., 3. Of the 67 percent of women who did not report USC to a military
authority, the main reasons they cited were: they did not want anyone to know (70
percent), they felt uncomfortable making a report (66 percent), and they did not
think their report would be kept confidential (51 percent).
27. DOD Report, vol. I, 72.
28. Lindsay L. Rodman, “Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual
Assault,” Joint Force Quarterly 69 (2013): 26, retrieved from .
29. DOD Report, vol. I, 40.
November-December 2013
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