Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 76

While commanders are responsible for creating a command climate that exudes professionalism and encourages respect, the lower echelons of leadership will win the war at the platoon, squad, and individual levels. SHARP Stand-Down Days are important to educate and initiate discussion on the topic, but they alone are not enough. Leaders must rigorously enforce the principles of SHARP at every formation, function, office, motor pool, and flight line on a daily basis. Commanders must provide a safe environment for their subordinates. In no way should this be confused with an environment that lacks discipline or encourages laziness. This is about the commander addressing misconduct within the formation. Strong senior leaders must empower strong subordinate leaders to ensure they are setting the proper example and creating an atmosphere conducive to trust and open communication without fear of intimidation or repercussion for doing what is right. Creating a Culture of Respect The U.S. Armed Forces is the most adaptable, successful, and morally anchored force in the world. It is national news when senior military leaders fail to uphold certain core values and principles in their daily lives. I am proud to be part of an organization that demands the highest level of moral fortitude from leaders at every level. Frankly, if a leader cannot uphold the high ethical standards expected of officers and senior noncommissioned officers, then they have no place in this organization. How can one be trusted to instill order, discipline, respect, and resilience into their subordinates when they fail to display those qualities in their own lives? We have seen a recent strategic surge to end a problem that is poisoning our formations, but ultimately, the success of this strategy is dependent on the quality of the implementation at the lowest levels. Because of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the agile and adaptive leaders throughout our Armed Forces maintain a certain skill set that can apply at the lowest levels. Commanders must ensure a fair, deliberate process to determine the guilt or innocence of any individual accused of an offense. The atmosphere within our units must change— complacency must end. Leaders at every level have a professional and moral obligation to become more involved in the lives of their subordinates. This begins by strictly enforcing a professional work environment, but also extends to social situations. We are professionals 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, and must conduct ourselves accordingly. By applying these fundamental principles, we can reshape our approach to SHARP as we continue to promote dignity, respect, and integrity in the fight to end sexual assault in the Armed Forces. MR NOTES 1. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1. 2. Ibid., chap. 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities.” 3. Ibid., 1-11. 4. FM 3-24, 1-5. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 1-21. 8. Ibid., E-2. 9. Ibid., 1-26, 5-13. 10. Ibid., 1-15. 11. John Nagl, debate on Counterinsurgency and the Future of Afghanistan, 22 April 2013, at Grinnell College, between Col. Gian Gentile and Dr. John Nagl. Video from: . 12. FM 3-24, 1-9. 13. Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902,” Parameters, XXXV (Spring 2005): 58. 14. Seth G Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 8. 15. Ibid., 1-26. 16. Ibid., 1-2. 74 17. Ibid., E-3. 18. Jones, 9. 19. Ibid., 10. 20. Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2013), vol. I, 1, available at . 21. Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2013), Volume II, 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, 3, available at . 22. Ibid., 2. 23. Ibid., 1. 24. Ibid., 3. 25. Ibid., 4. 26. Ibid., 3. Of the 67 percent of women who did not report USC to a military authority, the main reasons they cited were: they did not want anyone to know (70 percent), they felt uncomfortable making a report (66 percent), and they did not think their report would be kept confidential (51 percent). 27. DOD Report, vol. I, 72. 28. Lindsay L. Rodman, “Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault,” Joint Force Quarterly 69 (2013): 26, retrieved from . 29. DOD Report, vol. I, 40. November-December 2013 • MILITARY REVIEW