Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 12

The Strategic
Planning “Problem”
Maj. Gen. Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr., U.S. Army;
Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Graves, U.S. Army; and
Col. Christopher N. Prigge, U.S. Army

Maj. Gen. Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.
is the deputy chief of staff, Operations
and Intelligence, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe. He holds
an M.S. in strategic studies as well as a
masters in business and international
relations obtained in France, where he
studied as an Olmsted Scholar.
Brig. Gen. Tom Graves is the executive
officer to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. His most recent assignment prior to arriving at NATO was
the director of the School of Advanced
Military Studies, Leavenworth, Kan.
He is a graduate of the United States
Military Academy (USMA) and holds
an M.S. in educational technology from
McNeese State University.
Col. Chris Prigge is the director of
the Advanced Strategic Planning
and Policy Program at the School of
Advanced Military Studies. Col. Prigge
is a graduate of USMA, earned an
M.S. from the School of Advanced
Warfighting and the School of Advanced Military Studies, and holds a
Ph.D. from Harvard University.
PHOTO: A U.S. Marine watches a
statue of Saddam Hussein being
toppled in Firdaus Square, in downtown Bagdhad, 9 April 2003. (AP
Photo/Jerome Delay, File)

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VER THE PAST decade, the U.S. Army has struggled with a host of
complex problems in pursuing its strategic military objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. Problems like ethnic and tribal politics, lack of suitable
governance at many levels, collapse of the rule of law, diverse cultural and
religious norms, radicalization and extremist groups, economic challenges,
illegal drug trade, external state interference, and cross-border sanctuaries
have confronted planners in both theaters. We can expect these problems
and others to be part of the contextual dynamics of future campaigns. Consequently, a significant question has emerged for the Army: How do we
prepare officers with the knowledge, skills, and experience to develop strategic plans to address complex problems for which solutions are not easily
identifiable?
The Army’s answer to this question initially focused on the procedures
and processes that planners use to understand and develop solutions to
problems. The Army relies heavily on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), which is tremendously useful at solving complicated, but
familiar operational and tactical problems. The process is ideally suited
to rapidly develop effective courses of action for problems that can be
framed using existing doctrine. However, despite MDMP’s tremendous
value, the process does not force commanders and their staffs to ask the
appropriate questions necessary to grapple with complex but unfamiliar
problems. As became clear in Iraq and Afghanistan, campaign strategies
and many of the operational challenges required a broader understanding
of the environment, an understanding of the interplay of nonmilitary elements, an ability to cooperate with a wide range of intergovernmental and
multinational partners, and in many cases a new lexicon to describe the
environment. As Gen. Martin Dempsey explained in 2010, “In Iraq and in
November-December 2013

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