Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 49

MILITARY OCCUPATION

and the Department
of War set up civil affairs courses for
potential occupiers—at
Columbia University
and the University of
Virginia, respectively.
As time went on, other
schools were added.9
Similarly, the United
States also began to
plan and prepare for
the occupations of Axis
countries after the war.
Initially, the plans
for occupation were
(Photo by Staff Sgt. Russell Bassett, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)
crafted by individuOregon National Guard and Japan Ground Self Defense Force troops salute the U.S. and Japanese flags
al organizations: the
during the Orient Shield 2007 opening ceremony 9 October 2006 at the Sekiyama Maneuver Area
Army, the Navy, and
in Honshu, Japan. Japan has emerged as one of the United States most important allies. However, this
occurred as a matter of defense policy expediency and not by U.S. design.
the State Department.
These first plans were
not coordinated and thus often were at cross purWorld War II, were put in place. In sum, there was no
poses. But, in the final months before the defeats of
similar serious effort to consider and prepare for the
Germany and Japan, an interagency body—the State,
occupation of Iraq before the invasion of Iraq.
War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)—was
This was true despite the fact that, unlike during
created, which worked surprisingly well. It was also in
World War II, an organization to coordinate interthe last months before defeating Germany and Japan
agency policy, the National Security Council, did exist
that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had wanted
prior to the invasion of Iraq. But, in the end, it was
civilian occupation authorities, was persuaded that
not used as effectively as SWNCC had been to cooronly the U.S. military had the large-scale capacity to
dinate occupation policies across the government.
take on the myriad tasks of occupation. Consequently,
Finally, just as Roosevelt and others wanted
he directed the Department of War to take charge,
civilians in charge of occupied territories, the Bush
which it did by establishing military commanders and
administration felt the same way about occupying
command structure over the interim governments.
Iraq. The difference was that Roosevelt was finally
In contrast, though the United States had been
persuaded that only the military had the physical
planning for the combat operations for a potential incapacity together with the necessary command and
vasion of Iraq for an even longer period than had been control structure to take on the myriad tasks indone for war with Japan—during the ten-year period
volved in occupations.11 In contrast, this realization
after the first Gulf War—the pleas by various milidid not sink in for the Bush administration. Though
tary leaders during that time to also stress planning
the Department of Defense was placed in charge, it
for the post-invasion did not gain traction. Within
responded by organizing the CPA (and ORHA before
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance,
it), without a clear chain of command in place and
promising beginnings on such planning were not
with no specifically delineated responsibilities nor
followed through.10 As a result, few initiatives, such as
authority to enforce accountability. As a result, the
developing a pool of regional experts through formal
occupation remained a hodgepodge of loosely affiliatschooling to serve as leaders in a potential occupation, ed organizations with no command and little control
as was done in preparation for dealing with the end of
throughout its short existence.
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

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