Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 48

with a promised commitment to deliver on time a well-developed policy to
members of an institution that desperately needed it to proceed with establishing order in their country. Such
failures only helped undermine IGC
confidence in the CPA’s competence
and trust in the United States.
Failure to have the ability to hold
this individual accountable to finish
the project also compelled us to contract out for development of a more
fully thought out and developed
policy, which was an unanticipated
expense and administrative issue
that produced greater needless delay.
Fortunately, we were able to obtain
the services from a world-class terrorism expert whom we contracted
through the RAND Corporation,
and the end result was a fuller and
well-written policy though it was
done well after when it had been
promised for delivery.
Unfortunately, this kind of incident
was not uncommon in the CPA, and
was due mainly to lack of authority
vested in the CPA to hold people
accountable resulting in lack o f follow-through, which was in stark con(Image courtesy of Library of Congress, Plate No. 66)
trast to the U.S. administration of the
Unlike the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, the occupation of Japan was
Japanese occupation. In SCAP, a dioverseen by a highly organized U.S. occupational force military government subject to
rective to a subordinate was, in almost
military discipline and internal oversight. Moreover, unlike the CPA, the U.S. occupaall cases, a legal order from a superior
tional authorities made the decision to administer the reconstruction effort through
officer. Consequently, there were few
the already established existing Japanese civil service and local government structures
that had survived the war after vetting such bodies to eliminate residual militarist
problems with follow-through.
sympathizers.
Preparation. Additionally, in a
showed up and said he would not be able to get it done,
closely related issue, unlike the Japanese occupation
and then he left.
experience, CPA staffers, for the most part, were
We had no authority over the individual to renot particularly prepared by background, education,
quire him to stay and deliver what was committed.
experience, or personality to work in the occupation
As a result, we were then compelled to hastily write
environment of Iraq. This highlights another key
a draft policy, which we delivered on the promised
difference between the two occupations by comparing
date. Nonetheless, the lack of accountability and folthe strategic foresight involved in what would be relow-through was not only an inconvenience, but was
quired for a successful occupation. The United States
also an embarrassment at the time. It was a disservice in began planning for the occupation of Japan as early as
terms of wasted time, but also was a failure to comply
1942.8 For example, both the Department of the Navy
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May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW