Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 140

aspects of warfare by blaming past failures on the military’s targeting approach and the tools used to prosecute
it. Cockburn’s antitechnology and antiwar views in
general cloud his analysis of drones as a useful platform.
Technology, whether it be computerized analytical tools,
battlefield sensors, or unmanned aviation, is a reality
and it would be irresponsible not to harness it to win
wars. Cockburn should not shun its use, blaming it for all
failures, but rather should analyze where we are getting
drone use wrong and recommend how we can use it
better. Cockburn should have separated the strategy—
high-value targeting—from the tools used to prosecute it
(drones); they are certainly linked but not the same. By
viewing drones, RMA, and high-value targeting as inseparably linked, Cockburn undermines his conclusions.
Ultimately, Kill Chain highlights many missteps of
the U.S. drone program, but as a result brings up several valid questions as Americans continue to grapple
with the implications of emerging drone technology
in the future of warfare. Despite its biases, Kill Chain
can significantly contribute to American understanding of the implications of these platforms.

Capt. William J. Denn, U.S. Army, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas

OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: The
Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla

David Kilcullen, Oxford University Express, New
York, 2015, 342 pages

M

any books are written analyzing past
conflicts; however, few of them manage to link past events with the current
tendencies in order to predict the nature of future
conflicts and come up with recommendations to
counter them. David Kilcullen accomplishes this
with Out of the Mountains. His diverse background as
a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army
and as a senior advisor to Gen. David H. Petraeus
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provides him with a
comprehensive knowledge about counterinsurgencies
and conflicts. The author shows a unique knack for
combining his tactical understanding from operations on the ground with the knowledge of the policy
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and strategy decision processes taking place the highest
level of government.
Kilcullen claims that the existing theories on
conflict, including his own on counterinsurgency, are
too narrow to address the uncertainty of today’s ever-changing and sporadic conflicts. Based on four global
megatrends, Kilcullen uses case studies of different
events and conflicts to highlight how these megatrends
affect these incidents. This analysis leads to his new
“theory of competitive control” that explains how
nonstate armed groups draw their strength from local
populations in
competition with
the state.
The four global megatrends
identified by
Kilcullen are population growth,
urbanization, littoralization, and
connectedness.
These megatrends will affect
not just conflict,
but all aspects of
life. Although the
trends themselves
might seem obvious, analyzing the effects is a complicated process. One way would be to isolate each factor
and study it individually, but according to Kilcullen,
this methodology does not provide viable answers.
Since the factors are all mutually connected, these
trends must be looked upon as “systems of systems.”
While population growth, urbanization, and littoralization has gone on for decades, although at an accelerating rate, the real game-changer is the connectedness.
The access to information anywhere in the world via
the Internet and social media has provided nonstate
actors and individuals with a powerful tool that only
few years back was reserved for states. This has changed
the battlefield of conflicts and dissolved many of the
physical boundaries. An example of this presented by
Kilcullen is the 2008 Mumbai terror attack in which
the terrorists carrying out the attack used Skype,
cellphones, and satellite phones to stay in contact with
their leaders in Pakistan, who monitored the social
May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW