Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 139

BOOK REVIEWS

job. He seamlessly connects the soldiers in their foxholes
to the generals in their headquarters, encompassing all
levels from small unit tactics to theater strategy, including the ambivalence to downright negativity over
the plan by many in the German leadership ranks. He
provides an excellent account of Obersturmbannführer
Otto Skorzeny’s infiltration of English speaking German
soldiers behind American lines, and the “overreaction
bordering on paranoia” it created. The anecdotal accounts of the senior leadership, particularly on the Allied
side, demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses, character,
and overall personalities of this disparate group.
An important component of the book is how the
author weaves the impact of the battle on the civilian
population with the military aspects, adding another
human dimension. The kindness shown by American
troops toward the Belgians and the reciprocation of
these suffering people is juxtaposed against the abuse
and cruelty by the Waffen-SS. This enriches the overall
picture Beevor paints of the conflict.
The well-known command structure controversies
are thoroughly handled, most importantly the transfer of the U.S. First Army to Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery, angering his American counterparts.
Montgomery’s public pronouncements, aided by a complicit British press corps, resulted in a public relations
nightmare for not only Dwight Eisenhower, but also
Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Alan Brooke, who
understood the deeper implications. Beevor argues that
this ensured that the British would minimally influence
the conduct of the remainder of the war.
An in-depth and captivating account of this important battle, Ardennes 1944 is an outstanding addition to
the bookshelf and is highly recommended.

Gary R. Ryman,
Scott Township, Pennsylvania

KILL CHAIN: The Rise of the
High-Tech Assassins

Andrew Cockburn, Henry Holt and Company, New
York, 2015, 320 pages

I

n President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell address, he famously warned of the growing
military-industrial complex: “In the councils of

MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,
by the military-industrial complex. The potential for
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.” Andrew Cockburn’s book, Kill Chain: The Rise of
the High-Tech Assassins, at its surface, attempts to trace
the history of the U.S. drone program, but in reality is a
commentary on how drone warfare is a direct product of
Ike’s prescient warning. Cockburn articulates the danger
of the military and industry’s affection for automated
warfare despite surprisingly poor results that targeted killings have engendered on the battlefield. While
Cockburn brings many biases to his conclusions, Kill
Chain represents an important work in the U.S.’ public
discourse over the merits of expanded drone use.
Cockburn has written extensively on national security affairs, war, and military strategy. Known for his New
York Times Editors’ Choice, Rumsfeld, and his analysis of
the Soviet military in The Threat, Kill Chain represents
deeply researched first-hand military and intelligence
sources regarding the history of the U.S. drone program.
The scope of Kill Chain is vast: Cockburn connects
today’s modern drones to their roots in World War
II’s strategic bombing campaigns and the rise of automated battlefield sensors in Vietnam. He analyzes the
effectiveness of air power in Kosovo and the Gulf War
as well as the use of “high value targeting” across both
conventional and irregular conflicts like counternarcotics in Colombia.
Cockburn’s conclusions are clear: the military industrial complex is selling a profitable story that targeted killing with drones (and reliance on technology
in general) is an efficient improvement to warfare. This
story, more colloquially referred to as RMA (revolution
in military affairs), is misleading because the technology
is creating the opposite of its intended effects. Cockburn
highlights, for example, that eliminating cocaine kingpins
in Colombia actually increases cocaine supply in the
United States. Additionally, the targeting of terrorists
in Iraq and Afghanistan increases violence and further
radicalizes insurgencies.
A reader who is looking to study drones specifically should beware that Kill Chain is more a critique of
military high-value targeting and RMA in general—this
is where the author’s biases are most apparent. War is
tough, complicated, and the enemy always has a vote.
Cockburn rather oversimplifies and misinterprets these
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