Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 117

CYBER FORCE

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Chuck Burden, U.S. Army)

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley watches officers from the Army Cyber Institute 12 October 2015 at the U.S. Military Academy, West
Point, New York, demonstrate taking down a drone with a cyber capability rifle.

three questions to help determine an enterprise’s core
concept: What are you deeply passionate about? What
can you be the best in the world at? What drives your
economic engine?2 While the last question is difficult to
translate for the public sector, the first two help illuminate why cyberspace should not be a core competency
for the existing armed services. It is hard to imagine the
Navy as the best in the world at cyberwarfare at the
same time it is best in the world at maritime warfare.
Similarly, few marines would describe themselves as
deeply passionate about cyberwarfare. The delicate, distant nature of cyberwarfare conflicts with the Marine
Corps’ culture of up-close and personal fighting. By
shedding the distraction of cyberwarfare and transferring it to the new Cyber Force, the current armed
services maintain their focus on specific domains.
As a military service, the Cyber Force could
provide forces to each of the combatant commands
(CCMDs) in the form of a Cyber Service Component
Command (CSCC). Just as the existing armed service
components often serve dual-hatted as functional
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

components (e.g., an Air Force service component
command may also serve as a joint force air component command), the CSCC would shoulder the
functional responsibilities of cyberwarfare. The
Cyber Force could equip each of the geographical
CCMDs with a CSCC focused on the systems of that
CCMD’s area of responsibility. USSTRATCOM’s
CSCC could serve as global synchronizer of threats
that cross areas of responsibility, and U.S. Special
Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) CSCC might
provide cyberwarriors capabl e of physical infiltration
to achieve direct access to adversary closed-circuit
systems. Though perhaps beyond the DOD’s charter,
U.S. Transportation Command’s CSCC might aim
to harden the cyberspace systems of key transportation partners (e.g., key commercial freightliners,
air traffic controllers, or railroad partners), helping
the joint force overcome anti-access challenges.
Operating a cyber force is far simpler and more efficient than the existing services contributing forces to
USCYBERCOM, which then must cobble together
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