Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 50

ANCOP explosive ordnance disposal team member practices trouble shooting an MMP-30 EOD robot at Joint Regional Afghan National Police
Center, Kandahar Province, June 2012. (photos courtesy of author)

progress toward the development of an enduring logistics and maintenance capability in ANA
corps, brigades, and kandaks (battalions).”10 In
other words, the very skills that the Afghans will
need to stand on their own after the withdrawal of
coalition forces have gone unmeasured. Additionally, anecdotal evidence throughout Afghanistan
paints a grim picture of their readiness. As one
observer noted, “Entering this deployment, I was
sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true:
that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that
the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. . . . Instead I witnessed
the absence of success on virtually every level.”1 1
If we accept that Afghan forces are woefully
unprepared for “Afghanization” and that they
lack both a burning platform and a champion for
change, then it is incumbent upon us to discover
why this is the case. While illiteracy and corruption
usually top most lists of challenges to superior,
sustained Afghan performance (and UNESCO
48

estimates the literacy rate of ANSF as a whole
to be a stunningly low 14 percent), these are of
secondary, even tertiary import.12 Undoubtedly
literate soldiers are easier to train, especially given
the requirements of modern equipment, but this is
to suppose that the advantage of the Taliban is in
fielding vast hordes of college-educated troops,
who spend their evenings waxing eloquent over
Persian poetry. As for corruption, it is merely the
by-product of a patronage culture that selects
officers based primarily on political and familial
connection and fails to enforce accountability.
None of this should come as a shock to us. In a
parallel with Vietnam, the root of this failure traces
back to the Afghan officer class and harkens back to
Deming’s admonition that the problem with organizations is always at the top. “All senior advisers
found little improvement in South Vietnam’s officer
selection and promotion systems, and, while some
discussed slight improvements in leadership, all
agreed that this remained a serious problem.”13
January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW