MAGAZINE
SPRING 2020
Photo by U . S . Army Sergeant James AVERY , 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
new soldiers are recruited , acculturated , promoted , and in turn given the task of training following generations the primary , warfighting derived sources of the military ’ s organizational culture grow more distant . Cultural norms ( what is expected and what is taboo ), heuristics ( mental shortcuts or “ rules of thumb ”), and habits are continuously replicated and transmitted , but the tie back to the original wartime lesson fades , much like a series of analogue copies of an old audio tape . This military organizational cultural drift is often compounded by the overlap between the army as a large , bureaucratic institution and the profession of arms . Professional norms derived from combat experience can become muddled with “ company ” norms that define success in the organization . This stands in contrast with other professions , where institutional peculiarities of a particular hospital ’ s promotion system or law firm ’ s remuneration structure are distinct from the broader medial or legal professions . While ideally the bureaucratic norms of the military-as-institution should align closely with what is needed of an army in war , without the shock of combat it is difficult to judge whether a military ’ s organizational culture actually breeds agile and adaptive leaders . Furthermore , it becomes exceedingly difficult for officers and NCOs who have spent their entire professional lives within their own army ’ s culture to see , let alone improve , it . That is where NATO comes in .
A Broad Sampling to Learn & Improve A unique strength of the Alliance is that each of its 29 constituent armies each has its own distinct military organizational culture . Some of this culture is rooted in the societies from which they are drawn and in turn defend . While there is some variation , the democratic systems of government and free market
( 10 ) For example , some personnel policies that differ between otherwise similar armies include the regimental system , variations in promotion timelines , eligibility for retirement and associated ages of officers , implications of an “ up-or-out ” system , sabbatical opportunities , differing expectations for the similar ranks , and advanced education opportunities and utilization . These all shape priorities , motivations , and capabilities of soldiers and officers---and in turn the military organizational culture . economies of NATO member states form a broadly similar starting point . Wartime experiences are more varied than societal context , especially when including non- NATO , out-of-area actions such as the French in Vietnam and Algeria , the British in the Falklands , and the Americans in Southeast Asia . However , the Cold War provided a common context for many NATO nations , and more recent campaigns including Operation Desert Storm , Bosnia , Kosovo , and Afghanistan involved nearly every current ally . This broad commonality in society and recent combat experience allows for the isolation of the third root of military organizational culture : the internally driven , national variations that are tied to promotion , education , structure , budget , retirement , and pay . These factors profoundly shape how militaries develop agile and adaptive leaders . By looking across the Alliance each army can study the strengths , successes , and missteps of others , and develop better informed internal policies . Moreover , looking across the Alliance can enable each national military to see itself and its own organizational culture more clearly . They can compare their own , often subconscious expectations with the quirks , habits , heuristics , and expectations of other . This is invaluable , since , as outlined previously , armies can easily become ensconced in their own self-replicating cultures that are challenged only in war . If too ossified and distant from the demands of warfighting , a military that is unable to see itself will be incapable of developing agile and adaptive leaders .
Conclusion Working within an alliance , particularly one as closely integrated and large as NATO , can lift the blinders that a military often has to its own internal organizational culture . Not everything that is revealed is negative ; habits and heuristics that form part of one ’ s nation ’ s military culture may be revealed as vital to success when that army ’ s performance is contrasted with another ’ s . While specific examples of the impacts of explicit national policies , implied but important professional expectations , and heuristics used by leaders as shortcuts to judge potential are beyond the scope of this article , they are more evident to those who have served within an alliance than not10 . The takeaway is that some of these factors help develop agile and adaptive leaders , while others stifle them . Clearer recognition of one ’ s own internal organizational culture through deliberate comparison with those of a similar , allied military ’ s is critical to adjusting explicit policies and implied expectations to better grow the agile and adaptive leaders needed to meet the challenges of future warfare . LC
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