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Immersion into an army ’ s culture begins ( often in dramatic fashion ) the moment a new recruit reports . All militaries need to indoctrinate new members to turn them into effective soldiers . Arguably this process is more dramatic in democratic militaries , since the shift towards a collective mindset is greater than in authoritarian societies where such processes are widely employed across society . While discipline , subordination , and conformity is required for any army to function effectively , it serves only as the basis of any military ’ s broader organizational culture , which can be defined as “ a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration , that has worked well enough to be considered valid and , therefore , to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive , think , and feel in relation to those problems7 .” The process of acculturation into the military continues well beyond the initial indoctrination of recruits or officer cadets . In contrast to initial military training , which is consciously designed and follows broadly similar lines in armies across the world and throughout history , the organizational cultures of different national armies can vary significantly and result in dramatic differences in performance on the battlefield8 . Some of this military organizational culture is derived from the nation it defends ; for example , historians argue that Israel ’ s egalitarian society was reflected in its military ’ s ability to
improvise and use mission command successfully in fluid situations during the 1967 Six Day
War against more doctrinaire , inflexible autocratic adversaries9 .
Tracing Organizational Culture Other influences of military organizational culture are narrower , however , and discussed further below . In a military context tracing the evolution of organizational culture is complicated by two factors . First , in most countries the national armed forces are the military profession overlap entirely . That is , the only place to be a soldier is in the military , an obvious statement with an important second order effect . Most other professions have a range of organizations in which they can work ; doctors can switch hospitals and lawyers can depart their firms but still remain in the medical or legal profession . Leaving the military , however , means leaving the profession of arms . Therefore disentangling organizational
The principle of resilience is firmly anchored in Article 3 of the Alliance ’ s founding treaty :
“ In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty , the Parties , separately and jointly , by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid , will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack .”
motivations ( such as pay , promotion , and posting incentives ) from broader professional ones ( such as whether the military is adapting effectively to fight and win in the future ) becomes a knotty proposition . The most important source of a military ’ s organizational culture is what it has learned in war . This generates a second complicating effect with regards to how an army generates adaptive and agile leaders . As war is ( thankfully ) a rare event the lessons that are learned collectively by an army during and following a conflict can influence the force ’ s organizational culture for decades . These lessons can be captured either formally in doctrine and training or informally by shifts in the organization ’ s unwritten rules and shared , but unacknowledged , assumptions that is , its culture . As the recency of the conflict passes and
( 1 ) David A . Lake , “ Powerful Pacifists : Democratic States and War .,” American Political Science Review 86 , no . 01 ( March 1992 ): 24 – 37
( 2 ) Caitlin Talmadge , The Dictator ’ s Army : Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes ( Ithaca ( N . Y .): Cornell University Press , 2015 ).
( 3 ) Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam , Democracies at War ( Princeton University Press , 2002 ).
( 4 ) Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long , “ Democracy and Military Effectiveness : A Deeper Look ,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 , no . 4 ( August 2004 ): 525 – 46 .
( 5 ) Fowler , Eric S . “ Culture and Military Effectiveness : How Societal Traits Influence Battle Outcomes ” ( 2016 ). PhD dissertation , International Studies , Old Dominion University . -
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( 6 ) While many examples of mission command cite the Wehrmacht ’ s use of Auftragstaktik in World War II it is important to remember that Hitler ’ s strict orders precluding any retreat ( even to a militarily superior position ) in the Eastern Front both mirrored Stalin ’ s similar directive in 1941 and also led to tactical and operational calamity .
( 7 ) Edgar Shein , quoted in Kai Hammerich and Richard D . Lewis , Fish Can ’ t See Water : How National Culture Can Make or Break Your Corporate Strategy , ( Wiley , 2013 ).
( 8 ) David Grossman , On Killing : The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society ( Boston : Little and Brown , 1995 ).
( 9 ) Avi Kober , “ The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art , 1948-2008 ,” in The Evolution of Operational Art , ed . John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld ( New York : Oxford University Press , 2011 ), 169 .