closer to NRDC-ESP ’ s Forward Combat Support Areas . The nearest established SPOD / APOD / TLB were located in Trondheim , approximately 700 km south of Bodø .
The JTF-NE ’ s Joint Logistics Support Group ( JLSG ) was challenged to resupply NRDC-ESP from the Trondheim Logistics Hub . The main lines of communication ( LoC ) were via the single E6 two-lane highway or dual track railway which traversed complex , mountainous geography with little to no bypass opportunities . In addition , the LoCs could also be adversely affected by severe winter weathers conditions or FoS counter-mobility operations . The rail and road LOCs from Trondheim to NRDC-ESP Forward Line of own troops contained hundreds of bridges and approximately twenty large tunnels , most of them in excess of 1000 metres , which if destroyed / damaged could significantly delay or halt NRDC-ESP ’ s advance north .
The Port of Bodø and the nearby airport , although both not specifically fit for purpose to meet all NATO APOD / SPOD requirements , met an urgent need for the continuation of NRDC-ESP advance towards Narvik . The eventual capture of Narvik would then enable new larger logistic resupply opportunities to continue the campaign towards Tromsoe .
The exercise scenario allowed the PTA / STA to experience and react to a myriad of complex MILENG and Logistics infrastructure tasks that have rarely been considered in previous NATO exercises . Infrastructure has always been deemed important during military planning and execution phases but rarely has NATO considered infrastructure and supporting facilities within our own national borders . Due to Collective Defence Graduated Response Planning ( GRP ) activities , NATO personnel across the NCS / NFS are dealing with a myriad of HN infrastructure related issues that require constant CIVMIL liaison and coordination interaction .
As a result of conducting this exercise , LANDCOM has captured numerous infrastructure related lessons identified at the LCC level in order to improve internal SOPs and NATO / HN interoperability concerns . The following paragraphs will describe how a small tactical problem such as the establishment of a forward logistics hub can potentially require inputs and decisions involving strategic , operational , tactical and HN levels of Commands . Infrastructure is however , not just a MILENG function , it affects all plans and operations within all levels of Command and across the full spectrum of warfare .
Importance of Bodø
Bodø , along with NARVIK and TROM- SOE were assessed as essential ports that provide essential services to much of northern Norway . The Port and airport of Bodø , although not as capable or as large as southern designated APOD / SPOD locations in Trondheim or Kristiansand , was extremely well placed to support NRDC-ESP offensive operations towards Narvik . The Port of Bodø had a refuelling capability , cargo transhipment equipment and a roll on , roll off quay . It was however restricted with limited available marshalling space for equipment and supplies and constrained to one road LoC ( E6 ). The Port of Bodø did however have a nearby airport which could also be used as a supporting logistics enabler . In addition , Bodø is the farthest northern extent of the Norwegian railway network providing an additional LoC for onward movement of equipment and supplies for NRDC-ESP in case the E6 highway from Trondheim was denied . The advance into Bodø needed to occur quickly in order to limit enemy destruction of identified mission vital infrastructure ( MVI ). As a result , LANDCOM requested ISR and host nation support to further identify the current status of Bodø infrastructure capabilities and determine enemy effects on critical infrastructure as the opponent withdrew north .
In the simulation , NRDC-ESP had already experienced significant casualties of personnel and equipment as they engaged FoS Forces from Mo-I-Rana to Bodø along the E6 highway . As a result , NRDC-ESP needed an APOD / SPOD / TLB to quickly replace and reinforce degraded NRDC- ESP units and in turn , Bodø could support high casualty repatriation efforts .
During the enemy ’ s withdrawal , FoS Special Forces were positioned in LAND- COMs rear areas in order to attack road and rail infrastructure to delay the movement of NATO Forces and supplies from the Trondheim logistics hub . In addition , FoS theatre ballistic missiles units attempted to attack the Bodø seaport and airport with cruise missiles to deny NATO new APOD / SPOD operational capabilities . These attacks were unsuccessful but identified that infrastructure Force Protection measures would be needed early in the operation with advancing units to secure and protect them . Concurrently with the assault on Bodø , LANDCOM GENG tasked NRDC-ESP MILENG units to conduct engineer reconnaissance and provide an assessment on the operational situation of Bodø infrastructure . LAND- COM also coordinated a Joint inspection with Maritime Component Command to conduct an initial assessment on the Bodø seaport facilities . As a result of MILENG reconnaissance , HWY 80 leading east from Bodø and linked to the north bound E6 was also designated as MVI since no alternative LoC was available . The Hwy 80 MVI designation resulted in LANDCOM assigning route patrol / security tasks to be conducted by NRDC-ESP ’ s RC and EOD units .
After Liberation
Once Bodø was completely cleared of FoS Forces , it was reported that enemy inflicted damages to important Critical Infrastructure were minimal and would not require a concerted HN or NATO MILENG repair effort . However , additional capability support measures and redundancy systems were being considered to improve operational capabilities of Bodø APOD / SPOD installations ; this included power generators , fuel bladders , airport runway repair and cargo handling capabilities . Local hospitals were also inspected to assist in the casualty treatment and repatriations efforts of wounded / killed NRDC-ESP personnel . Bodø ’ s urban and rural regions did
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