face a considerable threat from Unexploded Ordnances ( UXO ), mines , IEDs , booby traps and field ammunition caches . Once it was decided to establish SPOD / APOD locations in Bodø , JTF-NE authorized the move of the TLB from Trondheim to Bodø in order to maintain proper level of Force Sustainment for NRDC-ESP forward units . FoS Forces originally occupied northern Norway with the intent to limit damage to regional infrastructure in order to win the hearts and minds of the local population and eventually use it if and when the region was successfully annexed by the FoS . The situation could have been completely different if FoS Forces destroyed potential MVI in Bodø before withdrawing . This would have effectively delayed the continuing push by NRDC-ESP towards Narvik or may have even caused NATO to consider a more dangerous impromptu amphibious assault into well defended enemy positions in Narvik . In addition , massive repairs to Bodø infrastructure would require the reallocation of high demand low density HN / NATO MILENG assets to be taken from supporting the current fight .
Infrastructure Considerations
NATO NCS / NFS units need to identify and develop itemized lists of CNI , MVI and KI appropriately related to their level of Command in order to implement infrastructure concerns into plans and later in the execution phase . The identification of Critical Infrastructure will also assist future planners to support longer term plans . Identified CNI will help NATO military forces understand and deconflict essential services that are required by the host nation to function effectively .
MVI identifies all NATO infrastructures that are extremely valuable to the mission . MVI can have a significant FP footprint that accompanies it as they are usually valuable target sets for enemy forces . It is important to deconflict the overall responsibility of infrastructure such as protection , maintenance and repair between the different Commands and host nation organizations . This coordination was conducted through Joint and LANDCOM daily divisional WGs , VTCs and Reports and Returns . NATO HQ staffs were uniquely connected throughout via VTCs in order to solve complex Joint infrastructure requirements , seek guidance and direction and to determine organizational level responsibilities ( NATO or HN ).
The Bodø operation scenario represented a small portion of LANDCOM GENG activities focused against the infrastructure problem set . Detailed Critical Infrastructure lists assessing CNI , MVI and KI were only partially developed for TRJN 17 during the planning phase . As a result , all LANDCOM Divisions spent a significant amount of time getting Command , staff and subordinate units familiar with the current infrastructure footprint in the Area of Operations . This limitation did however force the Component Commands and JTF-NE to coordinate routinely involving infrastructure issues . The HN also profoundly offered supporting national infrastructure details during short notice OPTs which solved tactical and operational capability issues . Bodø infrastructure datasets provided by Norway allowed NATO planners to quickly determine Bodø as a potential new logistical hub with available supporting SPOD / APOD facilities .
10LAND POWER