Russia ’ s Use of the Legal Element of Hybrid Warfare
By Mark Voyger ( USA )
The “ What ?”: RUS under President Putin is asserting its renewed regional hegemonic ambitions that have the potential to impact the international order on a global scale . During the current crisis in UKR RUS has resorted to the use of ‘ Legal ’ as an element of its comprehensive strategy . IOT prepare a coherent response to this new RUS challenge to the European security architecture , NATO and the West should develop a deep understanding and a unified response to the ‘ L ’ -element of RUS warfare .
The “ Why ?”: International law dealing with conflict between states has evolved in order to prevent war through negotiations and agreements ; regulate the right to go to war and set rules of engagement ; and normalize post-war relations through ceasefires , armistices and peace treaties . International law in its modern interpretation was NOT intended to sanction and justify invasions and annexation of territories , the way it is used by Russia in asserting its hegemony over UKR . Customary international law , however , is not carved in stone , as it derives from the practices of states (“ International law is what states make of it ”). This fluid , interpretative nature of international law is being used by RUS extensively and in the most creative ways to assert its numerous territorial , political , economic and humanitarian claims against UKR . The current international system based on treaties and international institutions has so far failed to shield UKR from the resurgence of RUS hegemony .
The “ How ?”: While RUS does not control the international legal system , and thus is not fully capable of changing it ‘ de jure ’, it is definitely trying to erode its fundamental principles ‘ de facto ’. Among these are : the inviolability of national borders in EUR post-WWII ; the inviolability of treaties ; the full domestic and international sovereignty of UKR ; the use of ethnic selfdetermination to subvert UKR ’ s unity as a nation-state ; the use of vague cultural traits to assert RUS right of intervention and territorial claims against UKR . Some specific examples since the beginning of the crisis have included : amended law on incorporation of territories into the RF allowing the annexation of regions of neighboring states following popular local referenda ( FEB-MAR 2014 ); amended citizenship law using residency claims dating back to USSR and RUS Empire to grant current RUS citizenship ( APR 2014 ); the practice of giving away RUS passports to boost the number of RUS citizens in neighboring states ( Abkhazia , South Ossetia ); the attempts to use the UN SC to sanction RUS opening of “ humanitarian corridors ”; the use of Kosovo and Libya as legal precedents for RUS action ; the sentencing of UKR officials in absentia by RUS courts ; and RUS propaganda fabricating a legal case to justify the entry of RUS “ peacekeeping forces ” to prevent “ a humanitarian catastrophe ” caused by “ the genocide ” of RUS-speakers by UKR “ Nazis ”.
The “ So What ?”: The above examples demonstrate the continuous RUS legal ‘ creativity ’ in bending or reinterpreting international law to achieve its strategic goals in UKR . The danger exists that other states could follow suit and lay claims on contested territories populated with their compatriots . The Middle East , Africa and Asia are particularly vulnerable given the arbitrary nature of many state borders there , but some NATO members are also not immune . To prevent RUS from turning UKR into the precedent that unravels the EUR security system , the international community must uphold UKR sovereignty over Crimea and UKR ’ s right to protect its territories and borders against any ‘ legalized ’ RUS intervention .
20LAND POWER