“ Nothing makes sense except in the light of evolution .” Theosodius Dobzhansky
THOUGHTS ON LAND WARFARE
Adapt or Perish on a multifaceted battlefield
By Lt . Col . Olivier-Edouard Entragues ( FRA ), LANDCOM
In April 1914 a young captain , at that moment a student at the Junior Division of the Staff College at Camberley , wrote an article called The Tactics of Penetration , a counterblast to German numerical superiority . This officer , J . F . C . Fuller , concluded that “ armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their former successes than by the skill of their opponents .” His commandant , Brigadier General Kiggell , considered that the author of the article had “ no military judgment ” and that he should better learn the Army regulations without being given the freedom to criticize . Ironically , Fuller , through his writings , would then become the true prophet of the Blitzkrieg and one of the leaders of military thought between the two world wars . Whereas NATO is facing a Strategic paradigm shift like never before , this historical example proves that we need to understand , individually and collectively , the path and the rhythm of military Darwinism .
The author proposes an analysis that suggests we must carefully look through previous land warfare transformations . Henceforth , the intellectual framework stressed in this paper encompasses the ability to think strategically at any headquarters level and critically analyse one of the leading objectives underpinning any Military Decision Making Process within NATO , especially within LANDCOM throughout its work as NATOs land advocate . The only real originality of this study is to follow a “ bottom-up ” approach throughout some leading land warfare historical trends in order to foresee the edge of Adaptation .
Land Warfare Historical Trends
Understanding land warfare requires understanding a broad range of transformations that have made war evolve throughout history . Rather than starting from the higher echelon , such as the strategic level , one could also benefit from a bottom-up approach . If one agrees that to be a good student of war , you first have to understand the tools you ’ ll be dealing with , the first step is to analyse the structure and basis of any military institution , which is tactics . Tactics is the product of the armies ’ evolution . This evolution could be described through four basics elements that determined armies as a living organism : the military organisation , weaponry and equipment , the methods of combat or doctrine , and the soldiers ’ mentalities . Since the creation of standing armies in the 17th century , the dynamics of evolution has been uninterrupted . Such process of military evolutionism highlights two main trends : the Law of small numbers and the Law of “ Constant tactical factor ”.
Law of small numbers
Let ’ s start by developing the Law of small numbers . Indeed , a study of the evolution of military – and especially army - structures from the Ancient Greece to modern times reveal that the big all-arms unit ( i . e . the main element of the land warfare ) is becoming smaller and smaller . During the Battle of Marathon in 490 B . C . to the French Revolutionary Wars in the 1790s , the reference unit is the Army was up to 100 , 000 men engaged in one block on the same battlefield . A leader , king or emperor , who is alternately policy-maker , strategist and tactician , leads the Army . From the
14LAND POWER