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The future of barriers looks toward effects based obstacles with a greater emphasis on more mobile operations . Engineer barriers are of course a part of this effect and not the effect in isolation . system of barriers which whilst they have the appearance ofcontainers , are in fact square steel pipes , bushings and steel cables that can be assembled to build elements of a
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So What ?
The borders of NATO have increased significantly from those halcyon days of the cold war and now see NATO with a significantly increased border length with our principal adversary .
NATO capabilities , post the peace dividend of the 1990s on the breakup of the Soviet Union , became more national in nature with increased focus on The War not A War .
The conflicts of the late 20th and early 21st century have been Counter Insurgency in nature which for many nations has meant the focus shifting to capabilities perhaps less relevant to the operations we face today .
NATO has moved from the Cold War days of eight Corps equipped in place and trained to defend against a well understood adversary , to today ’ s model of a scalable force , adaptable and more able to meet the challenges we face . This must be a force with the full range of capabilities to deter and
‘ Barriers buy time and space ; time is the most precious of all resources which when
lost can never be recovered . Space is manoeuvre and to manoeuvre is to win .’
Bde Comd Ex IRON HAMMER - West Germany 1987 .
Non Explosive Barriers
There are many alternatives to explosive based barriers which have and continue to prove effective , particularly against armour .
From the earliest beginnings of mechanised warfare to the present day a well-constructed hole in the ground is capable of restricting the mobility of the very earliest or most modern of armoured vehicles .
Simple and effective , the anti-tank ditch requires specialist equipment to affect a crossing tying up resources and time and concentrating an enemy force . Anti-tank ditching is of course time consuming to construct and therefore does not provide the most practical counter mobility option for mobile warfare .
Peacetime prepared obstacles , preconstructed and prepositioned if required , also provide a viable counter mobility option . Whilst no country will wish to see lines of concrete obstacles protruding from the countryside , unlikely to be a palatable solution politically or nationally , a stockpile able to be moved quickly provides one of a number of counter mobility option to block routes . More modern systems are available in order to produce the effect required . Manufactured in Switzerland and
positioned in border areas is a modular
roadblock . An element consists of three tubes which are then connected together with steel cables and fixed firmly . The fastening points of concrete are the only fixed installations . To deploy , establish and fight a NATO force in an Article 5 MJO + operation requires an ability to buy time through a combination of political and limited military means ; this is a strategy which continues to develop . The recent Warsaw Summit reinforced the message of Alliance efforts established to date , the Readiness Action Plan and the specifically NRF with up to a Divisional sized land element . This was further reinforced within the Warsaw Summit Communique looking to deliver an enhanced forward presence in Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania and Poland . Multinational forces based on four battalion sized battlegroups .
The Cold War is long dead and new initiatives in force placement to ‘ unambiguously demonstrate , as part of our overall posture , Allies solidarity , determination , and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression ’ 4 does not see a return to Cold War basing of troops .
We do not live in the past but we may sometimes be blinded by what we once had . Perhaps the time has come to reevaluate NATO barrier capabilities within a systematic and effects based approach and to consider reinvestment in this critical area of alliance capability .
LAND POWER27