Area Denial – NATO Challenges For Today
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The focus for NATO Land forces for over a decade has been centred on counter insurgency and stability . With a focus now centred on operations against a near peer adversary , the requirement of the alliance to deny that adversary access to areas and routes remains as valid today as it did 25 years ago . Whilst the requirement may remain effectively unchanged , in the context of an Article 5 MJO (+) operation , the alliances ability to prosecute this capability is very different to the days of the Cold War . This article will explore some of those differences and aims to provide some ‘ food for thought ’ to the reader , specifically on alliance barrier capabilities .
There have been a number of policies allied to political and structural changes that have impacted on national abilities to emplace barriers ; mines in particular are politically sensitive and comparatively costly as stocks must be replenished as they pass their useful life . With the introduction of the Ottawa Treaty in 1997 1 , denying area and route access through the use of antipersonnel mines is no longer viable for signatory or acceded nations , of which 27 are NATO members . Many countries have also reduced the use of anti-tank mines to impose control and or use through denial methods , which further exacerbates into a current capability gap . 2
So what exactly is a Barrier ?
The following extract provides a succinct explanation of the exciting world of the engineer and covers digging large holes , generally blowing things up and the laying of mines . Do not lose interest reader ; this article is not just for the engineer .
Fire , movement and obstacles are decisive factors in all operations . Obstacles are an essential element of defensive operations and their effects on the physical battlespace contribute to impose our will on the adversant . As such the Alliance defines tactical obstacles as Barriers . 3 Be assured this will be the last reference to any NATO Doctrine contained in this article .
The Good Old Days – The Cold War
Why the Good Old Days ? The Cold War afforded a degree of stability in the military psyche , whether East or West . It provided a level of certainty to the protagonists on a well understood theatre of
1 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use , Stockpiling , Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction , 18 September 1997 .
2 ATP-3.12.1 Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering Edition A Version 1 dated February 2016 , p 2-7 .
3 ATP-3.12.1 Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering Edition A Version 1 dated February 2016 , p 4-5 .
4 Warsaw Summit Communique issued by Heads of State and Government Participating in Meeting of the NAC 8-9 July 2016 . operations .
The Cold War Playing Field
�� �� ������ ������������� ������ force , even down to the names of opposing Divisional and Bde commanders , with intelligence on when , where and how your opponent trained .
�� ���������� ��������� ��� ���� ����� terrain you were expecting to conduct operations .
�� ���������������������������������� in nature and responsible for a specific geographic area . A Corps which could tailor its equipment , tactics and procedures to the threat it faced and the ground it was expected to fight upon .
�� ��� ������������ ����������������� issues or national caveats .
�� �� �������� �������� ����� ����� changed little other than to encompass new military technologies and tactics .
The Author Superimposing Anti-Personnel Mines on an Anti-Tank Minefield in the mid 1980 ’ s .
The Cold War – Emplacement of Barriers
The General Defence Obstacle Plan centred on the emplacement of large defensive barrier minefields . For the engineer this meant : �� ����� ������ ���� ��� ����������� barrier plan to contribute to the effects required by the commander .
�� ����� ����� ���� ���� �������������� areas , for mine dumps , safe lanes and minefield gaps .
26LAND POWER