����������������������������������������
Air Power ( Speed , Reach and Flexibility ) in a kinetic fashion , such that the airman would see Air as being able to provide the Commander with many capabilities for the benefit of the overall Plan . However , the soldier generally expects to have Air Power on-call , when and where he needs it – and to be able to see and feel its effects through CAS . This , however , reduces Air ’ s strength of being able to achieve Strategic effect one day , and tactical effect the next . Indeed , this philosophy has also resulted from the ‘ lessons ’ of recent conflicts ( such Op TELIC or HERRICK ) where a preliminary air campaign to shape the battle space was deemed to be unnecessary , that Land would lead the offensive and Air would follow on through CAS and Reconnaissance . But this ignored the fact that Iraq ’ s air defences had been progressively degraded since the end of the First Gulf War and Afghanistan had no air / anti-air capability at all .
In fact , Air is not just part of the execution of the Plan , or added to a Plan that has already been developed …. it needs to be part of the Plan and truly involved from the very start ; integration occurs when the effects of Land and Air are planned to re-
inforce each other from the start . This requires quality , knowledgeable and empowered individuals to be incorporated within the staff and Components . In terms of the planning stage , I offer some thoughts :
- Control of the air allows air and surface manoeuvre .
- Air Power allows the airman to fight or coerce an enemy before anyone else can .
- Air attacks on strategic assets can shape the land environment before a decisive act begins , adding tempo to the fight .
- AI can deal with threats early , that may otherwise require CAS later but with increased risk .
- Air Recce , manned and unmanned , offers greater reach and flexibility than Land Recce , although the Land / Air mix of information is optimum .
- Air Mobility , for light or special forces , is an accurate way of rapidly projecting force .
- Air platforms , particularly fixedwing , are increasingly flexible and able to rapidly switch between tasks within the same mission , and over large distances .
Needless to say , the air battle is complex , and lethal with imperative need for highly disciplined agile command and control processes
Lot of noise and moving parts in this picture that not only got your attention here but require the undivided attention of those who conduct the air battle
However , a very silent and invisible part of this picture is the massive amount information that must flow , uninhibited , uninterrupted , and uncorrupted to make all the movement happen at the right time , and in the right place .
While this picture depicts a mature theater , peacetime and contingency ops can be just as complicated . Complex ROE in an area with little infrastructure can require lots of information sharing between in-theater assets and remote C2 nodes .
But there also needs to be a true understanding of the other Components in order to build trust . However , developing all of this is not easy ; this lesson is hardlearned , but also highly perishable and easily forgotten . ALI has traditionally followed a cyclical pattern ; it improves when Land and Air are forced together through the imperative of conflict , or Exercise , and then reverts to single-service habits when these no longer apply .
In summary , ALI within the JTF HQ is a concept that requires strong joint relationships , effective and relevant joint training , an awareness of joint doctrine and capabilities , and detailed coordination and liaison from the outset of planning for an operation ; there also needs to be a real willingness to cooperate . Experience has shown that these requirements rapidly diminish as conflicts / Exercises end because resources reduce and priorities change ; once lost , they take even more time and resources to replace . Within a JTF HQ , ALI should be a day-to-day activity , not a technique brought out when required . It is a challenging concept to achieve , even in an era of high technology equipment and networking ; in the end , the weak link is invariably the human being .
Understand , Train Together , then Fight
LAND POWER11