Rāfidī Houthis
in Yemen
leadership in Iran gave the Rāfidah the strength and confidence
to mobilize internationally. The Rāfidah quickly took parts of
Yemen. The Syrian regime was already an ally of Iran. Lebanon
was largely under the control of Rāfidī militias. And with large
Rāfidī3 populations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and “Saudi” Arabia
(in the Eastern Province – Qatīf, Dammām, al-Ahsā’ – Najrān,
and even al-Madīnah), smaller Rāfidī populations in Qatar and
the UAE, and the Ibādī population of Oman all ready to move,
the Arab tawāghīt felt their thrones threatened. Meanwhile,
the Turkish tawāghīt worried about the aspirations of the
crusaders’ Kurdish allies and the opposition to the tāghūt
Erdogan regime based in the Rāfidī minority of Turkey. The
tāghūt triad also worried that prolonged wars in Yemen and
Shām would strengthen the Islamic State, as this would expose
the coldness and treachery of the tawāghīt and prove the
Islamic State was the sole defender of Ahlus-Sunnah against
the Rāfidah and atheists.
3 This includes the Rāfidāh of the Zaydiyyah, Ismā’īliyyah, and Imāmiyyah.
Qatarī and Turkish apostates posing
with the crusader John Kerry
Quickly, the tawāghīt of Turkey, Āl
Salūl, and Qatar – the triad of apostasy –
mobilized without seeking permission
from their crusader masters. They
gained support from the Arab and
non-Arab tawāghīt of Bahrain, Kuwait,
the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Senegal, Bangladesh, Sudan, Pakistan,
and Somalia, to aid the tāghūt regime
of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi against
the Rāfidah of the Houthis and
Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. And
despite the crusaders’ former claim of
the Rāfidī Houthis not being linked
to Iran, the crusaders pledged their
support for the operation.
Turkey then requested from its
Sahwah allies in Halab – addicted to
Turkish aid – to begin a war against
the PKK in parts of the region, after
a long truce had been observed by
the PKK and the Sahwah factions
including the Jawlānī front. The
apostate triad – Turkey, Āl Salūl, and
Qatar – also funneled aid to a newly
formed coalition of factions addicted
to tāghūt support – “Jaysh al-Fath”4
– to wage war against the Nusayrī
regime in Idlib and al-Qalamūn.
“Jaysh al-Fath” quickly added to its
priorities a war against the Islamic
State in al-Qalamūn. The funneling
of this aid is a matter to which the
FSA, SNC, the apostate triad, the
crusaders, and even member factions
of “Jaysh al-Fath” (such as Faylaq ashShām) admitted. The Sahwah factions
including the Jawlānī front moved
against the mujāhidīn of Dar’ā whom
they accused of being Khawārij. A
coalition of “Islamist” factions similar
to “Jaysh al-Fath” was quickly formed
in Halab. And suddenly the Sahwah
factions were advancing upon the
Nusayriyyah in Latakia and elsewhere,
while the favored “rebel” allies of the
4 Read about a major member faction of this coalition in the article
titled “The Allies of al-Qā’idah: Part 2” in this issue.
58 FEATURE