isis revista dabiq 1 | Seite 22

The tāghūt ‘Abdullāh of Jordan raises the jāhilī flag of his great-great-grandfather “Sharīf” al-Husayn in al-’Aqabah where the crusader T.E. Lawrence first planted it. Al-Husayn’s family quickly lost Syria to the French (one of their former allies), Iraq to other more “ideological” Arab nationalists, and Hijāz to the apostates favored by the British, ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Sa’ūd and his sons. The British realized ‘Abdul‘Azīz and his sons could not and would never call for further expansion of their kingdom outside of their crusader designated territory under the claim of a “caliphate,” contrary to al-Husayn and his sons who – due to their Qurashī lineage – had entertained the idea of a “caliphate,” albeit a nationalist one built by crusaders. The British thereby betrayed the nationalist “caliphate” they themselves had once supported. The various apostate puppet regimes set up by the crusaders after the colonial era all have modified versions of the first flag designed by Mark Sykes, sometimes using three of the four original colors. The “Arab Revolt” flag was the father of flags that today represent different Arab nationalist states including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, Syria (both regime and revolution), United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Palestine, various Arab nationalist movements in regions of Somalia, Morocco, Mali, and Iran, as well as the apostate Ba’th party and its apostate Naqshabandī “army.” 22 HISTORY These jāhilī flags essentially represent the crusaders, their apostate agents, Arab nationalism, and the puppet tawāghīt loyal to the crusaders. This brief history should spell out a number of lessons: 1) The crusaders do not have a problem with flattering their allies by propagating “Islamic” symbolism or allowing their allies to do so, as long as it is tainted with some nationalism. 2) The crusaders rely upon the strategy of “divide and conquer.” They break up Muslims’ lands through nationalism, partisanship, and other forms of jāhiliyyah. They might even support the supposedly “more Islamic” party against the more secularist parties, if they feel the latter are not capable of preserving their interests in the region, like they supported the false “Salafī” ‘Abdul-‘Azīz against the Sūfī al-Husayn. And this is what is expected in Shām. As the Free Syrian Army has failed to secure any Western interests whereas the “Islamic” Front has succeeded, the “Islamic” Front will most likely win the greater favor of the crusaders through their Gulf and Turkish mediators. 3) The crusaders do not have a problem in