International Journal on Criminology Volume 8, Number 1, Winter 2020/2021 | Page 51

The Jihadist Movement and Hirak in Algeria
or overflow . The destabilization of Libya has caused disorder in Mali , and with Algeria , it could be worse because it is the central state of the Maghreb .” But this was not the case .
Indeed , as Farid Allial explains , the Hirak did not lead to a security vacuum as was the case elsewhere in 2011 and , on the contrary , there was a strengthening of police presence everywhere , especially in the cities . At the level of the Algerian Army , it has not changed its deployment inside Algeria or at the borders . Also , the operations carried out by the Algerian Army against armed groups , some mediatized , while others are not , have continued and even intensified , as Salima Tlemcan points out . Many have also hypothesized that the Army and the authorities would try to weaken the Hirak by putting forward the risk of a return of violence linked to armed groups and conversely to assert themselves as protectors against these funds . In reality , since the beginning of the movement , the official authorities have made little reference to a possible return of armed groups as such . In terms of media strategy , they have rather put forward “ technological advances ,” notably the mastery of drone technology shown during operations against terrorist groups , the Army ’ s maneuvers during which its latest acquisitions are shown , and here and there some media operations involving the arrest of members of armed groups . As Khrief explains , “ there may be a bit of marketing here and there ,” but the fact is that the Army ’ s message is a warning about the overall political destabilization that could result from the pursuit of Hirak and the absence of a way out of the crisis , rather than a threat from armed groups .
Indeed , let us recall here that the authorities and this for several years have built a discourse based on the fact that terrorism was defeated and the stability of Algeria was regained . They could therefore hardly use “ the terrorist threat ” as a strategy to counter Hirak . It should also be noted that the authorities never tried to repress the movement except by carrying out arrests here and there , thus avoiding radicalization and mass violence as was the case elsewhere , and which had led the population to join the armed groups . On the contrary , the Army has , on several occasions , announced that it supports and accompanies the movement and its various demands , including a relentless fight against corruption . In all cases , as Farid Allilat explains , “ terrorism has been virtually eradicated , particularly through a professionalization of the fight against terrorism and an extremely dense and reinforced security network . The authorities are rather in the preservation of this situation ,” hence the discourse on the overall stability of the country .
The last element that raised fears of a security vacuum was the “ restructuring ” of the intelligence services following the resignation of President Bouteflika in April 2019 . Indeed , since 2015 , the intelligence services had changed their name from Department of Research and Security ( DRS ) to Department of Security Services ( DSS ) and were placed directly under the authority of the President rather than the Ministry of Defense . At the time , its powerful chief , General Mediene ,
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