International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 23

International Journal on Criminology
global jihad against the other super power, the United States, in the 1990s. 27 The
9/11 attacks in the United States were the benchmark occasion through which the
organization demonstrated its destructive capacity to the entire world; however,
these attacks also woke up the sleeping giant and triggered the onset of the global
response that brought AQ to the brink of its own destruction. 28 As a response to
the massive military and political campaign against itself, the organization was restructured
as loose networks. 29 The elimination of bin Laden by the United States
had a negative impact on the organization, especially by ending the myth that bin
Laden had been bestowed with divine protection against US attacks. 30 Nevertheless,
after the decapitation of bin Laden, AQ improved its organizational capacity
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and in South Asia and altered
its organizational structure from hierarchical to decentralized in order to
ensure the security of its leaders under the increasing volume and severity of the
military campaigns against it. The decentralized organizational structure of AQ is
characterized by the existence of several local affiliates that are directly (i.e., the
jihadist groups in Iraq and Yemen) or indirectly (i.e., Tehrik-i Talibani in Pakistan
and Boko Haram) connected to the core organization. 31 The central core of
AQ settled in the rough area along the Pakistan and Afghanistan border (AfPak
region) and has remained there for several years. The organization has not moved
its center to Iraq or Syria, despite the favorable conditions in those two countries
as a result of the Syrian civil war. AQ continued to use the AfPak region as its base
because the location was deemed crucial for the survival of the organization due to
its naturally protected geographical location and the convenience of getting support
from the local populations. 32 A base in the relatively safe haven of the AfPak
region enables AQ to provide strategic and ideological support to its affiliates overseas
while gaining power and consolidating its popular support through online
communication, which trivializes the need for geographical proximity. 33 Another
indication that AQ became a more localized organization and kept a low profile
after the military campaigns led by the United States is that almost all of the attacks
by AQ between 2007 and 2013 were against local targets in the MENA region (the
Near Enemy) rather than western countries (the Far Enemy). 34
of the Global Order (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 31–64.
27 J. Skovgaard-Petersen, “Heirs of Abu Bakr: On the Ideology and Conception of History in al-Qaeda
and Islamic State,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 16, no. 1 (2017): 25–36.
28 D. Byman, “The History of Al Qaeda,” Brookings Institute Op-Ed, September 1, 2011.
29 Skovgaard-Petersen, “Heirs of Abu Bakr,” 27.
30 M. Halimi, “Is Al Qaeda Central Relocating?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 7 (2016).
31 S. Jones, “Think Again: Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy 193 (2012).
32 Halimi, “Is Al Qaeda Central Relocating?” 34.
33 M. Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror,” Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 40, no.1 (2017).
34 S. Jones, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qaeda and Other Salafi Jihadists,” Rand Corporation
(2014): 36.
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