International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 24

Why Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups Pledge Allegiance to Al Qaeda or Isis
The future of AQ cannot be predicted easily. AQ is not a terrorist organization
that can be categorized and totally understood through classical analyses, as
the organization was able to develop new ways to retaliate after each destructive
move taken by its enemies. 35 The organization has a strong core and continues to
influence many other groups and individuals across the world via the Internet;
therefore, no one can claim victory against this sinister organization. As Hoffman
warns, although ISIS has put the cat among the pigeons by trying to act like a state,
AQ has been subtly rebuilding its strength by adopting AQ leader Zawahiri’s decentralized
franchising approach, refraining from bloody attacks (especially those
targeting Muslims) and by letting ISIS take the curse for all global counterterrorism
campaigns. 36
New Trends in ISIS
Unlike AQ, which has a relatively stable organizational structure, ISIS has
experienced several ups and downs since its debut in 2004. Abu Musab
al Zarqawi established ISIS under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and
Levant in Iraq, an organization that dates back to 1999 when Zarqawi established
Jamaat al Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq. 37 ISIS was a branch of AQ in Iraq, but it was
not until 2004, after the US invasion of Iraq, that Zarqawi pledged allegiance to
bin Laden. Between 2004 and 2010, ISIS often used aggressive and ruthless violence,
which prompted several relatively orthodox Sunni groups to part ways with
ISIS. In 2006, Zarqawi was killed during a U.S. airstrike. Egyptian Abu Hamza
Al Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri) replaced Zarqawi and, in 2009,
and changed the name of the group to ISI (Islamic State of Iraq). Zarqawi lacked
the necessary leadership skills to make significant progress toward achieving the
organization’s goals. 38 US strategies against ISI, such as humiliating the Sunnis and
letting them freely organize in prisons, paved the way for the group to restructure
and emerge as a stronger organization. 39 The civil war in Syria presented a golden
opportunity for ISI, which used the region as a safe haven after 2011. In 2015, ISI
renamed itself ISIS. 40 The relationship between ISIS and AQ ended when Baghdadi
declared his caliphate in Mosul in 2014. Although the martial view of AQ
was predominantly defensive, based on the liberation of the land of Islam from
35 C. Hellmich, Al-Qaeda: From Global Network to Local Franchise (London: Zed Books, 2011).
36 B. Hoffman, “Al Qaeda’s Resurrection,” Council on Foreign Relations Expert Brief, March 6, 2018,
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection.
37 K. Jasko et al., “ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology,” in Handbook of Contemporary Islam and
Muslim Lives, ed. M. Woodward and R. Lukens-Bull (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018).
38 K. Jasko et al., “ISIS.”
39 K. Jasko et al.
40 N. Sandal, “Apocalypse Soon: Revolutionary Revanchism of ISIS,” in F. Al-Istrabadi and S. Ganguly
(Eds.), The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2018), 17–38.
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