International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2015 | Page 29

International Journal on Criminology
the twelfth century and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (founder of Saudi Wahhabism) in the eighteenth
century are its models, having advocated and implemented a rigorist if not Puritan Islam.
Salafism most often manifests itself in a quietist manner without a political project,
and it is concerned above all that the believer should follow Koranic precepts to the letter.
But there are wide gaps between this version and Jihadism, or the recourse to violence in the
name of Jihad; this is sometimes called a “holy war” (a purely Christian term!), whether it be
local (Chechnya, Afghanistan) or global (al-Qaeda). “All jihadists are by definition Salafists,
but all Salafists are not necessarily jihadists” (Malek Chebel).
It was in Egypt that the Salafists achieved a significant electoral breakthrough, with
almost 25% of votes in the Constituent Assembly elections for the Al-Nour (Light) party.
This party promotes a society in which sharia will be applied without concession, particularly
with regard to women’s status; they are thus in direct competition with the Muslim Brothers,
who by comparison are undeniably modernist reformers.
The situation is somewhat similar in Tunisia, where Salafist pressure is very strong.
The movement did not put forward a candidate at the 2011 elections, and the most that
can be said is that in September 2012 an openly Salafist Tunisian Prosperity Party was set
up, appealing for the restoration of bigamy. The Salafists prefer to use the weapon of street
demonstrations, even if they are sometimes violent.
This has been true of Tunisia, where recurring riots have broken out. In June 2012
the pretext for them was an exhibition of paintings judged to be anti-Islamic; in October
2011, the premises belonging to a television channel were attacked after it had broadcast a
“blasphemous” film; and in April 2012 Salafist students provoked violent incidents at the
Manouba Faculty of Letters, demanding (to no avail) that female students should wear the
niqab. The pressure on Ennahda is evident, and certain more conservative elements of the
party are quite susceptible.
President of the Republic Moncef Marzouki, a lay person who emerged from the
Congress for the Republic, considers that “it is . . . a strident, pernicious phenomenon . . . but
in the end it presents very little danger for society, which massively rejects it. It is a rejection
shared by the state authorities . . . including Ennahda.”
These soothing remarks were belied by two murders committed in 2013: the
assassinations of the lawyer Chokri Belaïd and the National Constituent Assembly member
Mohamed Brahmi were attributed to the Jihadists, and there followed sporadic confrontations
with the army. These murders caused anger in the opposition, whose two main movements
are the Popular Front (a coalition of 11 left-wing parties) and Nidaa Tounes (center right),
and they also provoked the anger of the General Union of Tunisian Workers, a powerful
trade union.
A major political crisis broke out, leading to the resignation of the prime minister,
who was replaced by another Ennahda member, Ali Laarayedh. The work of the Constituent
Assembly was blocked between August 2013 and early 2014, with the opposition clamoring
for the government’s resignation, and the government demanding an agreement on the
constitution, the timetable, and electoral law before it did so. The Islamists were reproached
for their indulgence toward the most violent Salafists, in particular those belonging to Ansar
al-Sharia, a militant group that has carried out numerous acts of terrorism and has pledged
allegiance to al-Qaeda; they were also blamed for their failure on the social and economic
front.
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