International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2015 | Page 28

From “Arab Spring” to Jihadist Ice Age: Approaches to the “Complex East”
minister. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party acquired 27% of votes in the
House of Representatives in 2011 and its leader was also appointed prime minister by
King Mohammed VI. It is interesting to note that these two parties formed a coalition
with other political powers of different tendencies (such as the left-wing Ettakatol party in
Tunisia).
Egypt witnessed the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood, which obtained a relative
majority in the Constituent Assembly but, most importantly, saw one of its members
become president: in June 2012 Mohammed Morsi won out, with almost 52% of votes in
the second round, against Ahmed Chafik, the unofficial army candidate.
It is true to say, on the other hand, that the Islamist surge did not reach Libya:
the 21.3% votes for the Justice and Construction Party placed it far behind the (so-called
“liberal”) National Forces Alliance with its 48.8% at the poll on July 7, 2012, for the National
General Congress. Moreover the case of Yemen has very little connection to the “Arab
Spring,” since it involved a leadership tussle for power arbitrated by the Saudi Kingdom
and the United States, causing President Saleh to vacate his position, thanks to a prepared
“election,” in favor of his “friend” and vice president, Mansour Hadi.
The electoral victory of the Islamists gave rise to mistrust, not to say doubt, in the
West, even if some wanted to believe in the possibility of a democratic Islam.
In Morocco, the PJD recognizes royal authority and coexists with the makhzen
(the royal system for controlling the country). Its intentions to date have been peaceful
and conservative: after all, is not the monarch the commander of believers and a direct
descendant of the Prophet?
In Tunisia, Ennahda claims to follow the Turkish example, meaning that of the
(Islamist) Justice and Development Party that has held power for years, and it does not
question the foundations of the secular state; at the same time it “Islamizes” legislation when
this is possible. Nevertheless, the leader of the Ennahda parliamentary group proposed in
February 2012 that the system of Islamic values should be one of the main benchmarks
of the future constitution, which should not contain provisions that were contrary to the
Koran. Moreover, a bill has been tabled that aims to sanction attacks on sacred values.
Prime Minister Jebali himself has not hesitated to speak of a sixth caliphate.
This ambiguity is also apparent in the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party. The
younger party members proclaim “essential democracy,” kinship with Christian Copts,
and the need of equal status for women. President Morsi has declared that he would
not question the peace treaty with Israel, and did not hesitate to react firmly against the
commando attacks in Sinai on August 5, 2012. However, a quite considerable proportion
of the brothers do not identify with the modernism of the young, often Western-trained
cadres, but more with the historic slogan “God is our objective. The prophet Mohammed
is our leader. The Qur’an is our law.”
The key role played by the Syrian Brothers at the heart of the revolt similarly
disturbs Western decision makers, even while the leaders of the Free Syrian Army are
affirming their desire for a Syria that respects multiconfessionalism. But it is above all the
existence of violent Salafist groups that poses a problem, and indeed the “Arab Spring” was
an unhoped-for opportunity for Salafism to return to the fore.
Salafism’s intention is to return to the idealized Islam of pious ancestors or salafs,
making the Sunnah and therefore the practice of the Prophet paramount. Ibn Taymiyyah in
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