Innovate Issue 1 November 2019 | Page 21

WELLBEING purely for the benefit that it brings to listeners. In one student case study, their reflection suggested they felt good because they have acted altruistically and that is as far as their thinking on the subject needs to go. Despite the ostensible altruism of the action, the experience generates a wellbeing payoff for the student that is self- gratifying. Students sometimes experienced complex and dissonant feelings when attempting to reflect on the value of the activity. One student wrote with ironic detachment; “I seldom think about the impact I have made on their lives or about how compassionate I am, as feeding my ego with how much of a good person I am, takes the selflessness out of selflessness”. Again what is paramount in this example is a sense that virtue is a given and that thinking about it might even undermine the value inherent within the action. The frame of reference for evaluation is the self, and if there is any wellbeing benefit to be derived, it is certainly hedonic. Despite their assumptions of virtue based on their altruism, there is a lack of evidence for eudaimonic wellbeing in the students’ reflections. This does not necessarily mean there is none, various factors may be limiting their engagement. Levels of emotional maturity and feelings of embarrassment when talking about emotions, for example, could be further inhibiting influences on the students when reflecting on their experience. To look further at students’ motivation and priorities, we can examine the experience of a Year 11 student who dropped out of the activity because she was suffering from anxiety about her GCSE exams which were still six weeks away. The student was highly motivated by academic achievement and her expectations of success were contributing to her anxiety. She felt overloaded with work and needed to reduce her activities to give herself time to rest. In consultation with her parents and her pastoral tutor she decided that her VSU activity could be missed because it was less important to her than academic work. The student felt that her VSU was something she had to do, because the school required her to do it. We might infer that she did not experience a significant enough wellbeing benefit from the activity to want to do it when she felt down and tired. The priorities of all (student, parent and the pastoral tutor) are predicated on the need for maximum scores in the anticipated exams. This is indicative of the application of “instrumental reason” to a situation focused on a student’s wellbeing and mental health (Taylor). Taylor (2003) suggests that in the absence of other criteria, the value of our actions is determined according to “cost-benefit” analysis. In this example an attitude towards education that carries an implicit, silent set of moral value judgements is being justified by instrumental reason. There is no recognition from the child, parent or the educator, that the simple act of reading a poem aloud to another person is beneficial to a wider group of people than the individual student. This is sacrificed in the interests of maximal exam grades and mental health and wellbeing, arguably become secondary considerations. In the context of evaluating the wellbeing benefits of reading poetry aloud, my observations suggest that any positive wellbeing in the form of feelings of connectedness are mitigated by the priorities of the students. The high academic standards of the school and the competitive selection process for entry mean the students who attend the school already have a greater 19