HUKUK
The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
These “primary sanctions” are explicitly set forth by CAATSA. However, comp-
liance is complicated by CAATSA’s requirement that the President to impose
sanctions against individuals and entities both in the U.S. and abroad, even
when it seems conduct has nothing to do with the U.S. Such instances are often
referred to as “secondary sanctions.”
Yazı: Av. Mehmet Baysan
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I. INTRODUCTION
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he Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”) requires the Presi-
dent to sanction targeted Iranian, Russian, and
North Korean sectors, and penalize direct or
indirect support of them. CAATSA was signed
into U.S. federal law on August 2, 2017 and has imposed
new economic sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
The Act has three sections: Title I – Countering Iran’s De-
stabilizing Activities Act; Title II – Countering Russian In-
fluence in Europe and Eurasia Act; and Title III – Korean
Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act.
The passage of CAATSA seems to indicate the U.S. legisla-
ture’s growing willingness to enact sanctions laws, which
traditionally lie in the purview of the President. By enacting
CAATSA, Congress essentially usurped control, in most cas-
es directing that the President “shall” make a determination
as to whether very specifically defined sanctionable con-
duct has occurred and, upon making such a determination,
requiring the President to implement sanctions for which
Congress has provided the parameters.
The executive branch maintains a modicum of control in
that the President sometimes makes the determination
as to whether activity is sanctionable. However, this de-
termination
is again subject to the very specific
definitions
provided by Congress. Some sections
also allow
the Presi- dent to select which
sanction(s) to implement, providing power over severity.
In addition, the executive branch usually is able to waive
or terminate sanctions under limited circumstances often
involving congressional review and all with the common
requirement that no adverse impact befall the US as a re-
sult. In addition, most sections applicable to Russia require
congressional approval. As a practical matter, negotiations
between the President and Congress usually ensue upon
submission of a waiver or termination for review. Howev-
er, the statute provides no further Congressional override
once Presidential waiver or termination is in place.
CAATSA passed 419-8 in the House and 98-2 in the Senate,
making it “veto-proof.” Knowing legislative override was in-
evitable, President Trump quietly signed the bill into law,
expressing concern that it will limit the President’s abili-
ty to make “far better deals” than Congress can. He com-
plained the law is congressional infringement on his presi-
dential power to set foreign policy.
II. SUMMARY
A. Title I - Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act
Title I of CAATSA, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9401 et seq., pro-
vides for imposition of sanctions against (1) Iran’s ballis-
tic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs,
(2) sale and transfer to Iran of military equipment or the
provision of related technical
or financial assistance, (3)
Iran’s Islamic Revo-