INmagazine Sayı 15 | Page 36

HUKUK The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act These “primary sanctions” are explicitly set forth by CAATSA. However, comp- liance is complicated by CAATSA’s requirement that the President to impose sanctions against individuals and entities both in the U.S. and abroad, even when it seems conduct has nothing to do with the U.S. Such instances are often referred to as “secondary sanctions.” Yazı: Av. Mehmet Baysan T I. INTRODUCTION 34 he Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”) requires the Presi- dent to sanction targeted Iranian, Russian, and North Korean sectors, and penalize direct or indirect support of them. CAATSA was signed into U.S. federal law on August 2, 2017 and has imposed new economic sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The Act has three sections: Title I – Countering Iran’s De- stabilizing Activities Act; Title II – Countering Russian In- fluence in Europe and Eurasia Act; and Title III – Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act. The passage of CAATSA seems to indicate the U.S. legisla- ture’s growing willingness to enact sanctions laws, which traditionally lie in the purview of the President. By enacting CAATSA, Congress essentially usurped control, in most cas- es directing that the President “shall” make a determination as to whether very specifically defined sanctionable con- duct has occurred and, upon making such a determination, requiring the President to implement sanctions for which Congress has provided the parameters. The executive branch maintains a modicum of control in that the President sometimes makes the determination as to whether activity is sanctionable. However, this de- termination is again subject to the very specific definitions provided by Congress. Some sections also allow the Presi- dent to select which sanction(s) to implement, providing power over severity. In addition, the executive branch usually is able to waive or terminate sanctions under limited circumstances often involving congressional review and all with the common requirement that no adverse impact befall the US as a re- sult. In addition, most sections applicable to Russia require congressional approval. As a practical matter, negotiations between the President and Congress usually ensue upon submission of a waiver or termination for review. Howev- er, the statute provides no further Congressional override once Presidential waiver or termination is in place. CAATSA passed 419-8 in the House and 98-2 in the Senate, making it “veto-proof.” Knowing legislative override was in- evitable, President Trump quietly signed the bill into law, expressing concern that it will limit the President’s abili- ty to make “far better deals” than Congress can. He com- plained the law is congressional infringement on his presi- dential power to set foreign policy. II. SUMMARY A. Title I - Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act Title I of CAATSA, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9401 et seq., pro- vides for imposition of sanctions against (1) Iran’s ballis- tic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, (2) sale and transfer to Iran of military equipment or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, (3) Iran’s Islamic Revo-