Indian Politics & Policy Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2020 | Page 65

Understanding Voting Patterns by Class in the 2019 Indian Election
percent spread; 32 percent credited the
air force alone for the strike (35 percent
of the Rich, 27 percent of the Poor, other
classes in between) and 16 percent
credited the Modi government and 22
percent both, showing a large degree of
support (70 percent) across classes for
the action. However, it would be too
much to infer that that one action in
late February swung the election in favor
of a decisive NDA victory.
Relatedly, on the question of
“how nationalist” the Hindu and Muslim
communities are, a tricky question
since “nationalist” can be variously interpreted
(sometimes quite erroneously
as pro-government), 57 percent (Rich 65
percent, Poor 50 percent) found Hindus
to be highly nationalist, only 27 percent
thought Muslims to be so, fairly evenly
across classes, and 11 percent thought
them to be “not nationalist at all.”
On the polarizing issue of the
Babri Mosque, a narrow majority of 40
percent to 32 percent (with a large proportion
of Can’t Say or No Response)
thought that the demolition of the Babri
Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 was not
justified, with narrow spreads across
classes in each of these responses, but
with majority disapproval of the demolition
in each class. However, the fact
that almost a third justified the demolition
indicates the spread of the de facto
BJP position. Among those who had
heard of the demolition, 37 percent said
that a temple should be built on the site
of the demolished mosque, while those
who said that a mosque should be built
or that both a temple and a mosque
should be built add up to 35 percent.
Class differences within these opinions
are very narrow (spreads of less than 5
percent). A considerable degree of Hindu
consolidation across classes appears
to have taken place on this particular
issue.
On the question of whether in
a democracy the “will of the majority
community should prevail,” 23 percent
fully agreed (19 percent Poor, 27 percent
Rich, others in between) and 27 percent
somewhat agreed, while 30 percent fully
or somewhat disagreed (inter-class
spreads are very narrow in each category
of response). This is a tricky question
to interpret, but only under a quarter
fully agreed with the completely majoritarian
position. It is also noteworthy
that among those who fully disagreed
(16 percent), the Rich were 20 percent
and the Poor 13 percent; perhaps indicating
more liberal attitudes correlate
with education and information.
On whether “the Muslim community
has been victimized under Narendra
Modi’s government,” opinion
was divided, with 14 percent (Rich 17
percent) fully agreeing but 24 percent
(Rich 24 percent) fully disagreeing.
The above questions seem to indicate
both a premium on perceived
effective leadership and some degree of
majoritarian consolidation in explicit
(Babri Mosque) or vague opposition to
minorities.
However, and very importantly,
on some other questions explicitly
about attitudes to minorities, the majority
of respondents seem to have attitudes
in line with pluralism and accommodation
of minorities.
61