PERSPECTIVES
Changing Alliances
The changing Sino-American relations in the Pacific
underscore the geopolitical axiom of former British Prime
Minister Lord Palmerston (1855-8, 1859-65), who suggested
that Britain had “no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies,
only interests that were eternal.” Shifting national interests
and allegiances are still the currency of international affairs.
At the recent ten-nation ASEAN summit, Vietnam failed to
harness the needed diplomatic support against the Chinese
installation of HD-981. As the calculus of power changes
in the South China Sea, US Secretary of State John Kerry
summarized the American position: “we want to see a code
of conduct created; we want to see this resolved peacefully
through the Law of the Sea, through arbitration, through
any other means, but not direct confrontation and aggressive action.”
a “concircling” (containment and encirclement) policy but
deterrence with the simultaneous advancement of mutual
interdependence for greater benefits. It is a new type of
21st century power relationship between the two economic
powers guaranteed by Reagan’s “Peace through Strength”
doctrine, for which a stable China—with its masterful Communist Party for Confucian unity—must be included in
American geopolitical calculus.
Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War era,
there is no overriding contest for political ideology between China and the United States, which is now basically
driven by commercial and trade interests. The two economic
front runners—as an exporter and importer, producer and
consumer—have elevated trade as the center stage in SinoAmerican relations. For example, a nation that imports the
unwanted chicken feet ($677 million in 2008) from the
“The two economic frontrunners - as an exporter and importer,
producer and consumer - have elevated trade as the center in
Sino-American relations.”
When all nations are engaged in air navigation and
maritime traffic for commercial purposes, it is imperative to
follow a set of generally accepted protocols. The reality is
that China acts like the United States did when the new nation declared its Monroe Doctrine. As the historical parallel
paths seem to exist between the two powerful nations, Beijing
has now transformed its “Peaceful Rise” plan into President
Ronald Reagan’s “Peace through Strength” doctrine.
In the midst of territorial disputes in the East and South
China Seas, a Sino-American psychological warfare has
delicately begun to play out with General Fang’s visit to the
American super-aircraft carrier the USS Ronald Reagan.
The carrier underscores America’s supreme naval power
that seemingly cannot be matched by China for years to
come. The Chinese visit helped better understand that a
potential military engagement—with the Pentagon’s AirSea Battle (ASB) concept— would be decisive in favor of
the United States.
Even with the prevailing interpretation of such psychological war-games, which includes the media depiction of
Sino-American corporate espionage and the on-going cyberwarfare as well as the editorial and opinions of major news
outlets like The New York Times and The Washington Post,
American strategic designs for the containment of China
are misplaced. Some Chinese strategists would like to view
the evolving “new type of major power relations” through
the prism of Cold War mindsets within a broader context of
President Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense “Star Wars”
Initiative against the former Soviet Union.
No Concirclement
In all this, Obama’s rebalance strategy is not necessarily
United States prefers to keep their delicacy flow incorporated
in the total $36 billion American poultry market, according
to the US Department of Agriculture.
President Xi tries to rejuvenate China’s glorious past
(that kept with the United States until the Opium Wars)
as Obama gleans through the American economic history
and the Monroe Doctrine to see the future. Both nations
are historically tied by commercial intercourse. However,
t is unlikely that the classic ideas propagated in The Clash
of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington at Harvard and The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John Mearsheimer at the
University of Chicago would be realized within the evolving web of complex relationships. Huntington argues that
the Confucian culture in China and Judeo-Christian values
in America might lead to confrontation between the two
civilizations, and Mearsheimer claims that a rising power
has historically tended to clash with the existing great-power
nations.
Indeed, political realities and economic necessities
on both sides of the Pacific are different and alliances are
constantly changing. China needs the overseas markets and
natural resources to sustain its economic growth. To maintain global superiority, American military and intelligence
agencies must have expansive budgetary allocations, for
which Washington needs Beijing.
These are powerful incentives; both governments in
Beijing and Washington understand that a conflict or a proxy
war (through American allies or Chinese vassal states) would
be counterproductive and catastrophic. Reflective—but not
over-confident and reckless—leadership is needed to avoid
the likelihood of tragedies envisioned by Huntington and
Mearsheimer.
Summer 2014 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W
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