PERSPECTIVES
With the evolving tensions in the East and South China
Seas, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said that the
United States was concerned about China and its “dangerous
conduct and intimidation” in the Pacific. Directly referring
to the HD-981 rig in the Paracels, she added that “China’s
unilateral decision to introduce its oil rig into these disputed
waters [with Vietnam] is provocative and unhelpful.” Furthermore, referring to Japan and South Korea, the Deputy
National Security Advisor at the White House remarked
that “we have reaffirmed our support for our mutual defense
treaties with allies in the region, and have supported the efforts of the Philippines to pursue international arbitration
to resolve maritime disputes.”
For the latter, Washington and Manila have signed a
defense agreement to have regular joint military activities,
occasional training exercises, and rotational troop visits at the
Subic Naval and Clark Air Force Bases (which were returned
by the US Forces to the Philippines in 1991). Yet, American rhetoric has signaled that the Philippines must use the
international tribunal process for conflict resolution, which
purposefully sent an ambiguous policy message to Beijing.
Unlike the US-Philippines pact, Washington does not
have a defense treaty with Hanoi, but the potential for American access to Cam Ranh Bay—a deep-water naval base on
the South China Sea—is a sensitive matter for Beijing. The
Chinese and Vietnamese militaries have direct contacts at
the highest level; the two communist governments also share
close economic and trade ties. Recent political posturing in
Hanoi and Washington may signify a change of policy, which
might shift the balance of power in the South China Sea.
A New Type of Rebalance
When the state-owned China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) decided to locate the sophisticated
US$1 billion HD-981 oil rig within the contested Exclusive
Economic Zone near the Paracel Islands, it sent more than a
message of economic necessity; it is, in essence, a démarche.
Once again, with another oil rig in the planning and building of an airport and library, and settling Chinese people on
the Paracel Islands, Beijing basically claims the sovereignty
of the maritime territory demarcated by its historical but
controversial “nine-dash-line”.
There is another element to this strategic posture. A
few years ago, the US-based Exxon Mobil made two exploratory drillings and discovered significant reserves of
oil and gas near the Paracels. (The US Energy Information
Administration, however, maintains that no substantial oil
and gas reserves exist in the area). The CNOOC rig is carefully situated in proximity to these potential deposits. The
American economic and corporate interests will complicate
the matter. It is no longer just an issue of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, but a global
one including the US and China.
Political rhetoric will remain active while economic
interests that tie these countries together are difficult to
ignore. The stakeholders—especially the Philippines and
20
Vietnam—can ill afford to alienate China and its much
needed economic and developmental aid. Especially as the
geographically-distant United States can hardly fulfill the
material needs and aspirations of its Pacific allies and friends.
All of these multifaceted relationships work simultaneously
with competing national identities and economic interests.
Military-to-Military Relations
The economically intertwined Sino-American relationship has now shifted to the deepening of military-to-military
relations for greater confidence-building and cooperation.
US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s visit to the first Chinese aircraft carrier—the Liaoning—in April was followed
by a celebrated reciprocal visit of General Fang Fenghui,
chief of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to tour the
nuclear-powered USS Ronald Reagan in San Diego in early
May. In Washington, Fang also met with his counterpart
General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, after welcoming him in a full red-carpet honors
ceremony at the Pentagon and subsequent visits to military
installations. This is an encouraging sign of military-tomilitary relations as PLA Navy Chief Admiral Wu Shengli
also visited the USS Carl Vinson last year.
As the Fang-Dempsey meetings took place in Washington, the HD-981 incident between China and Vietnam
incited anti-Chinese protesters in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City,
and elsewhere. Public protests—with damage to Chinese
and other factories—would scarcely take place in Vietnam
without the tacit approval of the communist government in
Hanoi. As Washington warms up to Hanoi with the intention
of providing military support (similar to the Philippines),
Sino-American military relations are strengthening at the
highest level.
With historical military links between the two communist parties and ever-increasing trade and investment
between China and Vietnam, the two countries are trying
to prevent further escalation. The damage to other factories
owned by South Korean, Taiwanese, and Singaporean companies also signifies that these public protests are directed at
“Political rhetoric will remain active while economic interests that
tie these countries together are
difficult to ignore. ”
the prevailing industrial and labor issues in Vietnam. Hence,
both Beijing and Hanoi need to recognize the poor human
working condition