Global Security and Intelligence Studies
INT preparation involves analyzing information on medical and disease threats ; enemy capabilities ; terrain ; weather ; local medical infrastructure ; potential humanitarian and refugee situations ; transportation issues ; and political , religious , and social issues for all types of operations for both military and civilians ( Department of Defense 2013 ). However , MEDINT is not just comprised of military entities , but also contains numerous and far-reaching players in the civilian sector and at the Centers of Disease Control ( CDC ). Yet , the issues of MEDINT during the COVID-19 pandemic , and its forecasting and challenges , run parallel to the intelligence issues before the 9 / 11 catastrophe , and just like the aftermath of 9 / 11 , there will need to be an overhaul of how America , and much of the world , manages and monitors bio-threats .
9 / 11 , COVID-19 Forecast , and Financial Fiasco
On September 11 , 2001 , before
most Americans even knew there was a Wuhan , China , a large-scale unprecedented terrorist attack changed the intelligence security landscape , and American bio-surveillance is now at the same juncture for change . Four planes were the catalyst for reinventing the siloed intelligence community into the centralized Director of Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security . COVID-19 has the same potential to transform how MEDINT will be managed and coordinated for future bio-threats . America was teetering on the edge for both the terrorist attack and the pandemic , with evidence and briefings given by knowledgeable agencies and researchers well before a wet market virus or a mastermind in Al Qaeda had exhibited the predilection for disaster . For example , in the spring of 2001 , the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) repeatedly and urgently warned the White House that an unmatched terrorist attack was coming . By May 2001 , Cofer Back , former chief of the CIA ’ s counterterrorism center stated , “ It was very evident that we were going to be struck , we were gonna be struck hard and lots of Americans were going to die ” ( Whipple 2013 ). Cofer ’ s former boss , George Tenet concluded , “ The world felt like it was on the edge of eruption [ before 9 / 11 ]” ( Whipple 2013 ).
Similarly , MEDINT voices echoed in the halls of silence regarding a large-scale probable pandemic that had the power to stop America in its tracks . As early as 2005 , Health Secretary Mike Leavitt was mocked as Chicken Little by political rivals and late-night comics . “ In advance of a pandemic , anything you say sounds alarmist ,” Leavitt explained . “ After a pandemic starts , everything you ’ ve done is inadequate ” ( Whipple 2013 ). While the easy way out is to blame the current political situation in the United States for COVID-19 ’ s toll in America , the cycle of inattention has roots far deeper than the current administration , according to top policymakers from three administrations covering twenty years .
The 381-page Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act that Leavitt , Azar , and other health officials
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