Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 89

A New Russian Realpolitik: Putin’s Operationalization of Psychology and Propaganda
perfect fit for not only Putin, but also
the Russian people who were terrified
of, and resistant to, an unguided future.
Until Putin, the Russian masses did not
see an opportunity for their identity to
survive after the West’s perceived misrepresentations
and encroachments.
The Russian president spoke for the
people, echoing their sentiment by stating,
“they have lied to us many times,
made decisions behind our backs,
placed us before an accomplished fact.
This happened with NATO’s expansion
to the East, as well as the deployment of
military infrastructure [at] our borders”
(Khrushcheva 2014, 22).
Similar to Stalinism, Putin’s tenure
of Russian leadership since 2000
offers the Russian populace access to a
cause more significant than the individual,
but without the flawed and failed
political doctrine and ideology. The Russian
identity is now consolidated and redirected
by Putin’s systems as an effective
counterbalance against an overreaching,
imperial, and over-sophisticated Western
foe. The ever-growing base of support
that Putin has constructed feels a
sense of strong membership due to the
maximized differences between Eastern
and Western identities. The in-group
favoritism and out-group derogation,
along with the highlighted partisanship
between two historical foes, have “naturally
create[d] a bipolar partisanship
where individuals characterize [their
loyalties] into ‘us’ and ‘them’ and exaggerate
perceived differences [to favor]
their own group” (Greene 2004, 138).
Social identity theory and the harvested
identity salience, when properly resourced
and operationalized by Putin,
bleed over and support his already weaponized
elements of both image theory
and humiliation theory.
To date, Putin guards the precious
Russian identity that sweat and
blood has forged over several centuries.
However, “despite the fact the Russian
leader has consistently enjoyed markedly
high approval rates and has benefited
from charismatic legitimacy,” he
must be careful (Petersson 2017, 253).
He has used a particular blend of conservatism
and paternalism to solidify
the operational capabilities of identity
theory. If he attempts drastic modernization
or dramatic cultural inclusion
in his endeavor to jumpstart a stalled
economy or hindered societal elevation,
he risks alienating large segments of the
in-group population that he has systematically
cultivated since the start of
the new century. His current methods
thrive on enhanced and clear-cut differentiation;
any variable change resulting
in non-conformity to the historical
Russian identity could prove disastrous
for Putin or his “elected” successor.
Conclusion
Post-Cold War security and defense
discussion have often centered
on technology, complex
alliances, and traditional variables of
influence. For the last several decades,
neoliberal and realist factions have
embraced highs and lows in a bipolar
arena. However, it is with a new examination
of the constructivist and combined
elements mentioned above that
now proves other frameworks and factors
relevant. Expanded research at the
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