Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 29

Anonymous Versus ISIS: The Role of Non-state Actors in Self-defense
Non-state Actors Versus Non-state Actors in the Cyber Battle Space
Definitions abound to exactly what cyber-war looks like. The concept is
increasingly considered, challenged, debated, accepted, rejected, and embraced.
However, some parties are not convinced that war, which is essentially
destructive and leads to widespread loss of life, can be waged in cyber-space, nor
can cyber-conflict ever be described as “cyber-war” until such time as there is direct
and real “loss of life.” Others contend that cyber-war, or cyber-conflict, is confined
to what has been described as cyber-intelligence, cyber-espionage, cyber-disruption,
and cyber-sabotage; activities which can be—and are—undertaken independently or
in the context of a war. There are parties that claim that the effect of cyber-warfare
is not destructive in the real world and therefore not war like (Wisniewski 2013,
Valeriano and Maness 2012, Singel 2010). While cyber-attacks thus far have not
directly killed people or significantly damage property, it can be a vehicle for such
results. Economically, cyber-attacks may be able to cripple a nation in such a manner
that it may have a similar effect to a sustained physical attack upon its industrial base
or other facets of the economy (Ruus 2008). In that sense, cyber-war can have similar
outcomes or impacts upon a nation as a real war would, and therefore an impact on
non-state actors as well.
In 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council posited that by 2025 “Cyber and
sabotage attacks on critical US economic, energy, and transportation infrastructures
might be viewed by some adversaries as a way to circumvent US strengths on the
battlefield and attack directly US interests at home” (DNI 2008, 97). Thus, squeezing
or negating resources available to, or used by, non-state actors is a method which is
used to degrade the economic—and therefore political—capacity of those particular
actors. Traditionally, such action requires multistate actor collaboration. For example,
there is some obvious reluctance for airstrikes to target ISIS-controlled oil installations.
The environmental impact of such was there for all to see during the 1991 Gulf War.
Most of the ISIS-controlled oil sold on the open market is smuggled through Turkey.
Challenges for Ankara are numerous; porous borders, economic interdependence,
political weakness, fear of reprisal, sectarian and ethnic divisions all contribute to
Turkey being unwilling and/or unable to comply (Snyder 2014, Akyol 2014, Crompton
2014, Hawramy et al 2014, Giglio 2014, Hager 2014, and Sullivan 2014). Water
resources in the region can also be used as both a source of revenue or bargaining
chip for state actors and non-state actors alike. Again, Turkey plays a major role here.
Turkey closed the Ataturk dam on the Euphrates in August 2014 and reduced water
supplies to Syria and Iraq, which led to threats from ISIS. ISIS itself has used water and
electricity as a weapon, cutting off the Euphrates water supplies to the Anbar Province
in Iraq and electricity to parts of the Damascus region in Syria (Halevy and Yashar
2015). Activities such as the above are founded in the physical realm. However, the
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The question of Prisoners Of War (POWs) must surely fill the likes of Anonymous with dread. We
have already seen that ISIS does not abide by the rules—certainly not Geneva Convention standards—
in relation to management of prisoners and “enemy combatants.” Having said this, an equal response
by the hacktivists’ were they to do so, would, of course, violate Jus in Bello and the question of reprisal
action.
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