Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 28

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
most frequently mentioned right reasons—or “just causes” include “self-defence from
. . . attack; the defence of others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal,
aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing . . .”. Orend adds:
An important issue in just cause is whether, to be justified in going to
war, one must wait for the aggression actually to happen, or whether in
some instances it is permissible to launch a pre-emptive strike against
anticipated aggression.
The remaining Just War Theory requirements contend that motivations for war
or conflict must be morally appropriate; war can only be embarked on if the decision
has been made by those who have the authority to do so, has been done by a proper
and acceptable process, and publicly announced. As opposed to Jus ad bellum, Jus
in bello may cause some real problems for the international community of states
and numerous non-state actors. Just how one might hold those in breach of these
principles accountable—especially when anonymity applies? Even more difficult in
the cyber battle space context, how can we discriminate those innocent users caught
up in any escalation from those legitimate targets through the use of “weapons” such
as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) or a disseminated malware attack? A
deliberate DDOS attack would be taking “deliberate aim at civilians.” That being said,
Orend (2008) importantly tells us that “almost all wars since 1900 have featured larger
civilian, than military, casualties.” In the twenty-first century cyber-domain, while
ethically unjustifiable, this is still likely to remain true.
Cyber conflict is becoming increasingly more attractive as a method of “first
resort” and a real challenge to the just cause question becomes whether “first strike”
cyber-attacks could or should be considered an act of defense from aggression?
Targeting critical infrastructure that is managed or controlled via computer networks
is now a very real “first strike” option. If we take their efforts and capabilities to date,
as well as their language, Anonymous certainly believes that targeting ISIS is worth
an effort. And, in particular, where do the likes of Anonymous sit with this dilemma?
The use of weapons in cyberspace in a conflict may challenge the proportionality
component to Just War Theory. Posner and Sykes (2004) suggest that a just war may
proceed only if the benefits are proportional to the costs incurred. In a cyber-war
between Anonymous and ISIS, the limits of proportionality may become too big when
a nonviolent stratagem is employed against an extremely violent opponent. There may
be a kinetic response to a digital attack or disclosure that results in loss of life and is
clearly out of proportion. Just how far is a nonviolent non-state actor prepared to go
in a war of self-defense? What sacrifices are they willing to make for their cause? Is
this the “red line” that distinguishes whether a state actor actively or passively sides
with the nonviolent non-state actor? Further examination of some of the activities
conducted by Anonymous to date might provide a glimpse of what the organization
might, or might not, be capable of doing if it engaged in a full-blown cyber conflict
with ISIS.
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